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THE NATIONALIZATION OF CHILE'S LARGE COPPER
COMPANIES IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERSTATE RELATIONS
By JOHN FLEMINGt
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE nationalization of Chile's large copper mines has given rise to
a legal debate whose outcome may seriously affect international
economic and political relations during the coming decades. The con-
troversy concerns the "lawfulness" of Chile's actions as judged by
current standards of international conduct which serve to define a
nationalizing state's responsibility to affected foreign parties. On the
one hand, United States-based mining companies, whose assets were
nationalized by the Allende government in 1971, adamantly claim that
customary and generally accepted "minimum international standards"
require that aliens whose property is taken by a host nation for public
use must be "justly" compensated for their losses.' "Just compensa-
tion," as defined by the United States is an indemnity which is "prompt,
adequate, and effective" in its payment and which reflects the "going
concern" value of the assets taken.2 The mining companies assert that
if these minimum standards are not met, the act can only be considered
unlawful and thereby subject to international sanctions.
On the other hand, the Chilean government unwaveringly has in-
sisted that its nationalization program, as designed and executed, is
completely in step with existing international norms.' Therefore, it
t The author is engaged in independent research, on leave from the Georgetown
School of Foreign Service.
Grateful thanks and appreciation must be extended to the legal staff of the
Chilean Embassy in Washington for lending their valuable time and assistance in the
production of this Article. This research could not have been completed without their
kind cooperation. Also, David Giacalone deserves much gratitude for his most helpful
editing of this material.
The author is presently writing a major treatise, to be completed in late-1973,
on the political-economic development of Chile.
1. See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corporation, Expropriation of El Teniente: The
World's Largest Underground Copper Mine 64-79 (Aug. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
Expropriation].
Kennecott Copper Corporation, one of the nationalized companies (see notes
20-49 and accompanying text infra), has published its views in a series of pamphlets
concerning the nationalization. While expounding the corporation's own point of
view, the pamphlets also contain English translations of some of the Chilean documents
pertinent to the nationalization.
2. See notes 76-94 and accompanying text infra.
3. See, e.g., Brief of the Republic of Chile Resisting Review of Excess Profits
Deduction, in Kennecott Copper Corporation, Confiscation of El Teniente: Chile
Defends Confiscation and Suspends Debt Payment (Supp. 2, Feb. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as Confiscation].
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would view any punitive measures exercised against it as violating its
national sovereignty. The government and representatives of Chile
fully recognize the State's responsibility to compensate dispossessed
foreign property owners. In fact, the constitutional amendment au-
thorizing the nationalization of the mines involved expressly provides
for payment of "suitable" compensation.' However, Chilean officials
argue that no prevailing or compelling standards of international jus-
tice exist which serve to precisely define the terms of just compensation
and, therefore, Chile has instead turned to its own laws to interpret
its obligations.5
Besides providing for a maximum indemnity equal to the book
value of the assets nationalized, the Chilean nationalization legislation
also demands that the nationalized parties be held liable for the dam-
ages they inflicted upon the State while operating in Chile.' In accord-
ance with this quite significant interpretation of international responsi-
bility, Chile made a number of controversial deductions in computing
the amount of compensation to be offered to the North American min-
ing companies. Among the claims filed against the foreign mining
enterprises were deductions for loans invested poorly, assets and equip-
ment turned over in defective condition, and excessive profits. 7 The
result of this procedure was the elimination of any possible compensa-
tion to four of the five mining companies affected. 8
Complicated economic, social, and political factors led to Chile's
nationalization of its copper industry and must be understood in order
to understand fully Chile's legislative actions. Initially, it is important
to note that copper is Chile's primary natural resource and, by far, its
principal export product.' Today Chile is the third largest copper
producer in the world, behind the United States and Zambia, and ranks
second only to Zambia as an international copper producer-exporter."0
Income from the international sale of the red metal accounts for nearly
51 per cent of Chile's foreign exchange earnings and in recent years
has financed approximately 16-18 per cent of its national budget."
4. Law No. 17,450, July 16, 1971.
5. See notes 95-173 and accompanying text infra.
6. Law No. 17,450, July 16, 1971.
7. Comptroller General's Resolution on Compensation: Determination of the
Compensation to the Nationalized Copper Enterprises, Resolution No. 529, Oct. 11,
1971, in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1240-53 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Comptroller
General's Resolution].
8. Id.
9. COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ISSUES:
LATIN AMERICA 93 (1967) [hereinafter cited as COMMITTEE].
10. NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA, NEW CHILE 101 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as NEW CHILE].
11. CODELCO, Influencia del Cobre en la Economia Nacional 3-4 (1969). The
North American Congress on Latin America asserts that copper represents 80 per
cent of Chile's total exports. NEW CHILE, supra note 10, at 94.
[VOL. 18 : p. 593
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Yet until the mid-1960's, the greater part of the copper industry in
Chile was owned and operated exclusively by North American mining
companies, while the state's earnings from its copper resources were
derived almost entirely from taxes levied on the North American own-
ers of the large mines.' 2 As a consequence of this conspicuous financial
dependence on the foreign-controlled copper industry, Chile's national
ills as a struggling underdeveloped nation have often been attributed
to the foreign exploitation of Chile's precious metals. North American
mining interests have been accused of perpetuating and aggravating
Chile's weak industrial development, its primitive agriculture, its un-
employment and low salaries, and its misery and backwardness. 13 Ac-
cording to Chilean calculations, the three largest North American mines
alone have siphoned abroad some $10.8 billion in the last sixty years of
operations. In contrast, the entire Chilean national patrimony has been
evaluated at only $10.5 billion."
By the 1960's, nationalistic passions were aroused in Chile, and
nationalization in the minds of the majority of the Chilean public had
become synonymous with economic independence and an improved
standard of living. As a reflection of this mood, the two leading candi-
dates in the 1964 presidential elections, Eduardo Frei and Salvador
Allende, both pledged that they would nationalize Chile's major for-
eign-owned copper industries in the best interests of the Chilean people.'"
But while Allende committed himself to immediate and total'" nation-
alization of the large mines, Frei adopted a more moderate stance
whereby the State would first purchase 51 per cent of the controlling
stock in the North American companies." Frei's "Chileanization"
program further envisioned Chilean control over the sales and dis-
tribution of all copper and its by-products mined in Chile. With the
support of much of the political right, Frei was elected by a clear
majority of 56 per cent in 1964, while Allende placed second with 39
per cent of the vote.'" Together, Frei and Allende received 95 per cent
of the electoral support in 1964. In a broad sense this election was thus
considered a triumph for the forces of political nationalism in Chile. 9
12. See COMMITTEE, supra note 9, at 594.
13. President Allende, Mensaje de Ejecutivo, con el que inicia un proyecto de
reforma constitucional que modifica el articulo 10, No. 10, de la Constituci6n Politica
del Estado, Dec. 23, 1970.
14. Id.
15. F. GIL & C. PARRISH, THE CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER
4, 1964: PART I, AN ANALYSIS 27-29 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GuL & PARRISH,
PART I].
16. Id. at 27.
17. Id. at 29.
18. F. GIL & C. PARRISH, THE CHILEAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF SEPTEMBER
4, 1964: PART II, 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RETURNS 9 (1965).
19. See generally GIL & PARRISH, PART I, supra note 15.
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On January 25, 1966, little more than one year after taking office,
President Frei began moving forward with his proposed Chileaniza-
tion plans. At that time, legislation embodying the initial terms of the
Chileanization accords was submitted to Congress.2" As ratified on
April 25, 1966, this statute permitted the Chilean State to purchase a
51 per cent equity interest in the companies classified as the Gran
Mineria, i.e., those copper mining companies producing in excess of
75,000 metric tons of copper per annum.2' Included in this category
were three large mining companies which until 1966-1967 had been
totally owned and operated by two United States-based firms: the
Kennecott Copper Corporation and the Anaconda Copper Company.22
Together, these three mines accounted for over 80 per cent of Chile's
total copper production.23 In addition, the legislation provided for
state participation in two new developing mines: the Ex6tica Mine,
owned by the Anaconda Company; and the Rio Blanco (Andina)
Mine, owned by the Cerro de Pasca Corporation.2'
The Kennecott Corporation's El Teniente subterranean copper
mine was the first to negotiate the sale of a 51 per cent interest in its
holdings in Chile under the Frei administration. Until 1967, the El
Teniente mine had been owned and operated by the corporation through
a wholly-owned subsidiary.25 In December 1965, Kennecott entered into
an agreement with the Chilean government to form a new company, the
Sociedad Minera El Teniente S.A.2" Then, in 1967, the Chilean govern-
ment's Corporaci6n del Cobre (CODELCO) purchased a 51 per cent
20. Law No. 16,425, Apr. 25, 1966.
21. The classification known as the Gran Mineria was originally established by
Law No. 11,828, May 5, 1955, which specified that any mining company in Chile
producing 25,000 metric tons of copper per year or over would be subject to special
operating regulations. This definition was later revised to encompass those companies
producing 75,000 metric tons of copper per year. Law No. 16,624, May 17, 1967.22. Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1242.
23. NEw CHILE, supra note 10, at 94.
24. CODELCO, Algunas Aspectos de la Nueva Politica en el Cobre (July 25,
1969). Anaconda's Ex6tica mine, which was expected to go into production in 1970,
was projected to produce 100,000 metric tons of copper, and therefore was also classi-
fied as a component of the Gran Mineria. The Rio Blanco (Andina) Mine, on the
other hand, was not scheduled to reach an annual production of 75,000 tons per year
until 1972, and was not included in the Gran Mineria at that time. CODELCO,
Chile y Su Politica del Cobre (1972).
25. Expropriation, supra note 1, at 3-4. El Teniente was owned by the Braden
Copper Company, a subsidiary of Kennecott. While some of the agreements with
the Chilean government concerning El Teniente were actually entered into by Braden,
this Article, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, will refer to Kennecott as the
interested party in all transactions and disputes concerning the mine.
26. On December 3, 1964, following Frei's election, the Chilean government and
Kennecott executed a Memorandum of Understanding, which outlined the prospects
for Chile's direct participation in the ownership of the El Teniente mine. Pursuant to
that memorandum a new company, the Compania Minera El Teniente, was estab-
lished on September 16, 1966. On April 13, 1967, Kennecott, through Braden, (see
note 25 supra) transferred the whole of its Chilean properties to the new company
in return for 100 per cent of the stock; CODELCO then purchased 51 per cent of
this stock from Kennecott. Expropriation, supra note 1, at 80.
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equity interest in El Teniente from its North American owners for a
sum of $80 million, thus giving the State a controlling interest in the
mine." This purchase price was based on a capitalization of the joint
company at $160 million.2s It was further contracted that this sum
would be paid by the State over a period of twenty years, with the
proviso that an equivalent sum be loaned to El Teniente in order to
finance that company's new expansion plan initiated by the Frei gov-
ernment. Chile completed its payments in less than three years in
order to generate the funds required for the expansion program as
quickly as possible. 29
The expansion loan, guaranteed by the Chilean government,
totaled, with interest, approximately $93 million, and was scheduled to
be paid over a fifteen-year period beginning December 31, 1971 in the
form of negotiable promissory notes." By the terms of this transaction,
Kennecott was able to benefit from the influx of the sorely needed
capital in the El Teniente mine while assuring itself that the develop-
ment loan would eventually be paid in full by the Chilean government.
At the same time, it was to receive dividends from 49 per cent of the
profits earned from El Teniente's copper production, after taxes. The
Government, meanwhile, was able to defer for four years the real cost
of the 51 per cent stock purchase in El Teniente, by guaranteeing the
immediate reinvestment of all payments made to Kennecott.
In a parallel phase of his Chileanization program, Frei also en-
tered into a joint partnership with Anaconda in its new Ex6tica mine
27. See Note, The Chileanization of the Copper Industry, 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L.& POL. 158, 163-65 (1969); Decree No. 99 Concerning the Formation of Sociedad
Minera El Teniente S.A. and Authorization of Investment, Aug. 24, 1966, in 6
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1146 (1967).
28. The Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT), a leftist-controlled labor union,
announced that $160 million was an over-evaluation of the El Teniente assets, and
that in 1963 (before reevaluating its assets), the company had claimed its net worth
to be $65.7 million. Therefore, under no circumstances, CUT declared, should Frei's
government have paid more than $40 million for the 51 per cent interest in the ElTeniente mine in 1967. La Central Unica de Trabajadores de Chile, Problemas
Nacionale; Los Doce Grandes Esc~ndalos del Cobre 12 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Central Unica]. Kennecott, on the other hand, claimed its pre-reevaluation worth hadbeen $72,453,000. Following independent appraisers' estimates, the real book value of
the El Teniente properties (including depreciation) was established in 1967 at$244,394,000. See text accompanying note 189 infra. When the new mixed company
was legally formed on April 13, 1967, this net book value was increased to $285,667,000,
representing the contribution of total net capital to the company in that year. Accord-
ing to Kennecott, these figures were approved by the Chilean government in complete
conformity with Chilean laws. Kennecott Copper Corporation, Confiscation of ElTeniente: Expropriation Without Compensation 6-7 (Supp., Oct. 1971). Nevertheless,
for the purpose of capitalizing the Sociedad Minera El Teniente S.A. and pur-
chasing a 51 per cent interest, the Frei administration established the net worth of
the El Teniente mine at $160 million in 1967. Cf. Decree No. 2,167 Authorizing theExistence and Approving the Statutes, [Charter and By-Laws] of the Stock Corpora-
tion Named "Sociedad Minera El Teniente S.A.," Oct. 1, 1966, in 6 INT'L LEGAL
MATERLALS 1148 (1967).
29. See Expropriation, supra note 1, at 80.
30. Id. at 81-82; Note, supra note 27, at 164-65.
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and with Cerro in its developing Rio Blanco (Andina) mine. 1 Two
new joint companies, Compania Minera Ex6tica S.A. and Compania
Minera Andina S.A., were formed with Anaconda and Cerro respec-
tively. In the case of Ex6tica, CODELCO agreed to purchase 25 per
cent of an equity capital of $25 million in the new mixed company.12
This 1967 accord was actually an extension of a 1964 agreement in
which CODELCO and Cerro had jointly contracted to develop Rio
Blanco on the basis of a 25 year franchise granted by the State.8 8
The third phase of Frei's copper program referred to as the "ne-
gotiated nationalization," affected two remaining Anaconda Copper
Company subsidiaries operating in Chile, the Chile Exploration Com-
pany, which exploited the massive Chuquicamata open pit copper mine,
and the Andes Mining Company, which operated the Potrerillos-E1
Salvador copper mine. On December 31, 1969, the net assets of these
two companies were transferred to two new corporations, Compania
del Cobre Chuquicamata S.A. and Compania del Cobre El Salvador
S.A.8 4 Simultaneously, CODELCO purchased 51 per cent controlling
stock in both new companies with state-guaranteed, six per cent
promissory notes payable over twelve years.8 5 The 1969 book value
of the new companies was established at $275.4 million for Chuquica-
mata and $66.6 million for El Salvador. 6 Accordingly, the book value
of the 51 per cent holdings in the mixed companies was fixed at $140.5
million for Chuquicamata and $34.1 million for El Salvador. This
again was a sore point for the Chilean left, which claimed that the total
book value of both companies combined was closer to only $180
million. 7
By the terms of Frei's "negotiated nationalization" agreement with
Anaconda, CODELCO was given the option to purchase the remain-
ing 49 per cent of Anaconda's assets in the Chuquicamata and El
Salvador mines after January 1, 1973, but before December 31, 1981,
provided that 60 per cent of the balance of the purchase price of the
31. Note, supra note 27, at 172-78; see Decree No. 215 Concerning Authorization
of Investment in the Ex6tica Mine, Feb. 13, 1967, in 6 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 454(1967).
32. Fatouros, Documents and Legislation Concerning the "Chileanization" of
Anaconda's Chile Exploration Company: Introductory Note, 9 INT'L LEaxL MATERIALS
921 (1970).
33. See Note, supra note 27, at 172.
34. See Statement by President Frei on Negotiations for Government Acquisition
of Anaconda Company Properties, June 26, 1969, in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1073(1969) [hereinafter cited as Statement by President Frei].
35. Id.
36. ANACONDA COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT: 1969, at 22-23. Unlike Kennecott's
El Teniente assets, no revaluations of the holdings of Anaconda or Cerro took place
during this period. See text accompanying note 189 infra.
37. CUT claimed that Anaconda's total assets in Chile were worth only $180
million, and therefore, Frei should not have agreed to pay Anaconda any more than$90 million. See Central Unica, supra note 28, at 14.
[VOL. 18: p. 593
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first 51 per cent interest was paid.8 Purchase would again be with
government-guaranteed promissory notes issued by CODELCO."9 It
was agreed that the price for the remaining interest in the two mines
would be determined by multiplying Anaconda's share of the average
annual earnings of the companies after taxes by a factor dependent on
the date of the transaction.4 °
In retrospect, there can be no doubt that the Frei administra-
tion had clearly foreseen the eventual nationalization of Chile's major
foreign-owned mines. 4' In fact, Frei had already negotiated the total
purchase of Anaconda's holdings in Chile even before the 1970 presi-
dential elections.42  But by 1970, Frei's Chileanization program had
still not quenched Chile's thirst for nationalism. Although even the
rightist candidate in 1970, Arturo Alessandri, agreed that nationaliza-
tion of the large foreign-owned mines was in Chile's best interest if
executed fairly and justly, the Chilean people turned to their left for
leadership. Radomiro Tomic, the candidate of Frei's strong Christian
Democratic party, supported the "immediate and integral"4 nation-
alization of the Gran Mineria, as did the socialistic Dr. Salvador
Allende. The hard-fought campaign ended in victory for Allende,
who won office with a plurality of 36 per cent of the votes cast.44 Tomic,
a leftward-tilting centrist candidate, won 29 per cent of the vote.4"
Thus, Allende and Tomic together polled 65 per cent of the public's
support, indicating a strong national endorsement of immediate and
total nationalization of Chile's large copper mines.
The new socialist administration immediately seized upon what
promised to be a guaranteed political victory for the popular govern-
ment. By the time of Allende's November inauguration, the President-
elect's nationalization proposal was in its final drafting, to be sub-
mitted for congressional consideration on December 21, 1970.46 Fol-
38. Decree No. 116 Concerning the Acquisition of Majority Holdings in Ana-
conda's Chile Exploration Company, Oct. 31, 1969, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 924(1970).
39. Power of Attorney Setting Forth the Procedures for the Execution of the
Sale of CCC Shares by Anaconda's Chile Exploration Company to the Chile Copper
Corporation, in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 952 (1970).
40. ANACONDA COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT: 1970, at 25. See text accompanying
note 210 infra.
41. During a campaign speech in 1964, Frei stated that "if tomorrow's internal
or external events indicate that nationalization is a better alternative, I will not hesitate
to nationalize the copper industry." El Mercurio (Santiago), Apr. 9, 1964, at 27, col. 3.
42. Statement by President Frei, supra note 34.
43. American Embassy, Santiago, Chile, U.S. Dep't of State, Economic Programs
of Presidential Candidates 8-313, Aug. 21, 1970 (copy on file at the Villanova Law
Review).
44. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1971, at 1, col. 5.
45. Id.
46. Proyecto de Reforma Constitucional que Modifica Articulo 10, Nfimero 10,
de la Carta Fundamental, Dec. 21, 1970, in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 420 (1971)
(English translation).
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lowing six months of substantial deliberation and several minor amend-
ments, Congress unanimously ratified the constitutional amendment on
July 11, 1971." T Five days later the reform was enacted into law with
the President's signature.48
The constitutional amendment as ratified by the legislature modi-
fied chapter III (constitutional guarantees), article 10, no. 10 of the
Chilean Constitution, concerning the "Right of Property in its Various
Forms." For all intents and purposes, the law has now placed all of
Chile's basic resources and resource industries in the hands of the State
for reasons of national interest. In addition, the legislation attached
three "Transitory Articles" to the Constitution which specifically
called for the immediate and total nationalization of the companies of
the Grand Mineria and the Compania Minera Andina.49
Chile's nationalization of its large mines constitutes a bold chal-
lenge to traditional standards of international law, particularly as in-
terpreted by the United States. The advent of such a precedent at this
time may help to stimulate a significant revamping of international legal
standards with regard to nationalization of foreign-owned assets and
quite possibly may reflect profound alterations in the interstate system.
Nationalizing, expropriating, or requisitioning enterprises con-
trolled by aliens seems to be increasingly common in the contemporary
world." Within just the last several decades, a growing number of
movements toward economic and political nationalism have appeared
among less developed nations. Such nationalistic struggles are nor-
mally characterized by vigorous efforts to gain domestic control over
foreign-owned or foreign-operated enterprises. Naturally, the most
likely targets of such efforts are those foreign enterprises which are
involved in the exploitation of natural resources which are of key
importance to the economies of such nations.
The reasons for nationalistic movements among Third World
nations are probably as numerous and as varied as the states them-
selves. At the risk of making generalizations, however, it can be said
that most developing states are becoming increasingly self-reliant,
partially as a result of improved technological, industrial, and market-
ing capabilities, and partially in response to a growing awareness that
excessive external economic dependence often impedes real economic
47. See Versi6n Oficial, Sesi6n del Congreso Pleno, July 11, 1971, in El Mercurio
(Santiago), July 13, 1971, at 9, col. 1.
48. Law No. 17,450, July 16, 1971.
49. For translations of Chile's constitutional amendment, see 10 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1067 (1971) ; Confiscation, supra note 3, at 1.
50. For a more complete discussion of this current development, see Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, U.S. Dep't of State, Nationalization, Expropriation, and
Other Taking of United States and Foreign Property Since 1960, Doc. RECS-14,
Nov. 30, 1971 [hereinafter cited as Research Study].
600 [VOL. 18: p. 593
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and social development. Popular rancor, whether well-founded or not,
generally appears in those developing countries in which foreign-con-
trolled enterprises, accused of repatriating a disproportionate share of
the national wealth, operate in the midst of widespread poverty."'
Nationalistic struggles have not been confined to any one geo-
graphical area nor directed toward any particular nation, although
the United States has often been implicated by virtue of its extensive
international holdings. Some 34 noncommunist developing nations
have already nationalized, expropriated, or requisitioned United States
or other foreign-owned assets.52 This growing nationalistic trend is
reflected in the fact that 64 instances of nationalization, expropriation,
or requisitioning of concerns with United States ownership interests
have occurred in noncomnmunist countries since as recently as Janu-
ary 1969, while only 51 such actions were taken between January 1961
and December 1968."8 Of the 115 cases recorded since 1961, 70
(60.9%) currently remain unresolved, and 59 (84.3%) of these 70
cases have taken place since January 1969."4 Chile alone accounts for
16 of these.55 Furthermore, of these 70 currently unsettled cases, 27
(38.6%) affect resource industries.56 It should further be noted that
within the last several months foreign-owned petroleum industries in
Iraq, Abu Dhabi, Quatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia have been threat-
ened with at least partial nationalization in the very near future.5 7
Likewise, Venezuela's president, Rafael Caldera, recently announced
that over $5 billion in foreign oil investments in that country may be
taken over within the next two years, although present concessions
extend at least until 1983.18 In Guyana, the government has already
51. Id. at 1.
52. Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti,
Mexico, and Peru. Africa: Algeria, the Congos, Dahomey, Egypt, Guinea, Iraq,Israel, Kenya, Libya, Malawi, Sierre Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania,Tunisia, Uganda, Yemen, and Zambia. Asia: Burma, Ceylon, Khmer Republic, India,
and Indonesia. Id. at ii.
53. Id. at 8.
54. Id.
55. Id. To date, Allende's socialization efforts have resulted in the nationaliza-
tion or negotiated sale of large sectors of the foreign-owned business community. In
addition to the five mining enterprises of the Gran Mineria and Andina, the affectedforeign concerns include: Alimentos Purina (a subsidiary of Ralston Purina), Anglo-
Lautaro (a nitrate industry with a 51 per cent ownership interest held by the Chilean
government), Bethlehem-Chile Iron Mines Co. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Beth-lehem Steel), Chitelco (Chile's telephone company of which 70 per cent is owned
by ITT), Ford Motor Co. of Chile, Industrias Nibco (50 per cent ownership heldby Northern Indiana Brass Co. and 25 per cent held by European investors), RCA-Chile, and South American Power-Chilectra (70 per cent ownership interest held bythe Boise-Cascade Co.). Furthermore, the new administration has nationalized a large
portion of the banking industry in Chile, including Banco de Brasil, Banco Frances eItaliano, Bank of London and South America, First National City Bank, and the Bank
of America. Id. at 23-27.
56. Id. at 9.
57. Wash. Post, Oct. 6, 1972, at Al, col. 4.58. Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 1972, at A16, col. 1.
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nationalized a portion of the bauxite and aluminum operations of North
American businesses and is presently poised to nationalize the remainder
of the foreign-dominated aluminum industry. 9 Even Panama, whose
relations with the United States must remain relatively amicable due to
her financial dependence on the United States, is in the process of na-
tionalizing American utility companies operating there.6"
It seems certain that many nations of the developing world are at-
tempting to gain control over their own resources and that many major
industries face possible nationalization of their external investments
within the decade. Quite probably, nationalizing states, plagued by con-
ditions similar to those allegedly hindering Chile's development, will
look to the measures already tested by other Third World nations in
determining the limits of their international responsibilities. In any case,
the capital-exporting nations, as well as international businesses, should
be prepared for this likely contingency. But, more importantly, if the
international legal order is to remain effective and functional, it must be
able to deal with such transformations within the changing nation-state
system. "'
II. THE RIGHT TO NATIONALIZE, EXPROPRIATE, OR REQUISITION
THE PROPERTY OF ALIENS
It should first be made clear that Chile's right to nationalize the
foreign assets of the large mining enterprises in Chile is incontestable
under existing standards of interstate conduct. Practically without ex-
ception, the nations of the international community have fully recog-
nized the right of any state to nationalize property within its terri-
torial domain for public use, including the property of aliens. This
facet of interstate practice is regarded as a matter of state sovereignty;
it is axiomatic that no state can interfere with another's sovereign
right to dispose of property ownership privileges as it deems necessary.
Over the years, proclamations to this effect have appeared in nu-
merous documents. Certainly the most prominent contemporary decla-
ration of state sovereignty over material resources was that of the United
Nations General Assembly in 1962. A commission composed of nine
appointed members, including representatives of the United States, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Chile, met over a period of
three years to examine and discuss the historical experience of states
which have nationalized, expropriated, or otherwise requisitioned the
59. FORBES, Oct. 16, 1971, at 32.
60. Wash. Post, July 9, 1972, at G4, col. 1.
61. For an interesting discussion of nationalization in less developed nations, see
Rafat, Compensation for Expropriation of Property in Recent International Law,
14 ViLL. L. REv. 199 (1969).
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property of aliens. The task of the commission was to synthesize the
collective practices of these states and to formulate international stand-
ards which would accurately reflect this experience, as well as the cur-
rent realities of interstate relations.62 The report of the commission,
known as General Assembly Resolution 1803, was adopted by the
General Assembly on December 14, 1962, and contains the following
eight principles:
1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the
interest of their national development and of the well-being of
the people of the State concerned.
2. The exploration, development, and disposition of such re-
sources, as well as the import of the foreign capital required for
these purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and con-
ditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be neces-
sary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction, or
prohibition of such activities.
3. In cases where authorization is granted, the capital imported
and the earnings on the capital shall be governed by the terms
thereof, by the national legislation in force, and by international
law. The profits derived must be shared in the proportions freely
agreed upon, in each case, between the investors and the recipient
State, due care being taken to ensure that there is no impairment,
for any reason, of that State's sovereignty over its natural wealth
and resources.
4. Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based
on grounds or reasons of public utility, security, or the national
interest which are recognized as overriding purely individual or
private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases the
owner shall be paid appropriate compensation, in accordance with
the rules in force in the State taking such measures in the exer-
cise of its sovereignty and in accordance with international law.
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a
controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such
measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sov-
ereign States and other parties concerned, settlement of the dis-
pute should be made through arbitration or international adjudi-
cation.
5. The free and beneficial exercise of the sovereignty of peoples
and nations over their natural resources must be furthered by the
mutual respect of States based on their sovereign equality.
6. International co-operation for the economic development of
developing countries, whether in the form of public or private
62. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE U.N.: COMMENTARY
AND DOCUMENTS 136 (3d ed. 1969).
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capital investments, exchange of goods and services, technical
assistance, or exchange of scientific information, shall be such
as to further their independent national development and shall
be based upon respect for their sovereignty over their natural
wealth and resources.
7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty
over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders
the development of international co-operation and maintenance
of peace.
8. Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by, or be-
tween, sovereign States shall be observed in good faith; States
and international organizations shall strictly and conscientiously
respect the sovereignty of peoples and nations over their natural
wealth and resources in accordance with the Charter and the
principles set forth in the present resolution. 3
The fundamental intent of this comprehensive statement was to
promote international cooperation in assisting the independent de-
velopment of less developed countries around the globe.64 In addition
to the above eight principles, the Resolution emphasizes the equality
of all states, the right of every nation to self-determination, and the
importance of sovereignty over natural resources for rapid and inde-
pendent national growth.65
Similar declarations concerning national sovereignty over natural
resources have become relatively common during the last decade. In
Latin America, a number of statements noting the need to initiate
economic and social reforms based on mutual cooperation, respect for
the self-determination of peoples, and recognition of national sov-
ereignty, have been adopted within the last ten years. 6 One of the
more recent of such proclamations is the report of the Special Latin
American Coordinating Committeee (CECLA) presented during the
ministerial conference in May 1969, in Vifia del Mar, Chile. Known
as the Latin American Consensus of Vifia del Mar, this document was
signed on May 17, 1969, by twenty-two member nations. In addition
to detailing Latin America's position on international cooperation
63. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
64. Id. at 15.
65. Id.
66. Among these must be included: the resolutions and declaration of the
Bogati Conference of 1948; the Act of Bogotit of 1960; the Declaration to the Peoples
of America of 1961; the Charter of Punta del Este of 1961; the Charter of Alta
Gracia of 1964; the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro of 1965; the Protocol
of Buenos Aires of 1967; the Declaration of the Presidents of America of 1957; the
Action Plan of Vifia del Mar of 1967; the Charter of Tequendama of 1967; and the
Declaration of Santo Domingo of 1968. Report of the Special Latin American Coordi-
nating Committee on the Consensus of Vifia del Mar, May 17, 1969, in 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 976 (1969).
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within the hemisphere, the Consensus emphatically requires "[s]pecific
operative measures ... to remove the external obstacles that hold back
the rapid development of Latin American countries :,,6
Those measures must be based on the principles already accepted
by the inter-American and international communities, which
principles guarantee the political and economic independence of
the countries concerned [including] . . . the sovereign right of
every country to dispose freely of its natural resources .... 0s
At the opening session of the Vifia del Mar conference, it was Chile's
former president, Eduardo Frei, who introduced CECLA's procla-
mation. In his address, Frei reasoned:
The right of Latin American countries to adopt decisions regard-
ing the preservation and utilization of their basic resources, with-
in the framework of postulates such as the United Nations
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,
cannot be regarded as an aggression to anyone. Even from a
juridical and historic standpoint, the Latin American states in-
herited, from the Spanish or Portuguese crown, supreme author-
ity over the manner in which such wealth should be used for the
common weal. On the other hand, to forget this basic right of
the Latin American states to attend to their natural resources
can lead to the rigid institutionalization of situations which may
become a form of economic aggression, leading to irrational con-
flicts whose mere existence is disadvantageous for Latin America,
the United States of America, and all other countries.60
The Allende government was very well aware of its rights as a
sovereign state in nationalizing its large mines, and deftly employed
General Assembly Resolution 1803 to serve as the launching platform
for its socialization program. President Allende quoted the United
Nations Resolution when the initial nationalization proposal was de-
livered to the Congress, 70 and it was repeatedly discussed by both in-
ternational law authorities and congressmen during hearings before
the Chilean Senate and House Committees on the Constitution, Legis-
lation, Justice, and Rules when the constitutional amendment was re-
67. Id. at 977.
68. Id.
69. Address by Eduardo Frei Montalva to the Special Meeting of the Special
Latin American Coordinating Committee, May 1970, in 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 187 (1971).
70. We emphasize that with the nationalization of copper begins our second
independence. We will realize this nationalization by exercising our rights as
recognized in the United Nations Charter and as recognized by the Supreme
Court of the United States. This is not an act of vengeance against anyone, but
rather the exercise on the part of Chile of her supreme right to be free, united,
prosperous, and sovereign.
President Allende, supra note 13.
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viewed. Congressional transcripts of floor debates on the amendment
likewise contain frequent references to the doctrine. 7
Finally, it should be noted that no accords between Chile and
the United States or its private enterprises have ever been signed which
might have acted to enjoin the nationalization of North American
properties in Chile.
III. STATE RESPONSIBILITY INCURRED IN THE NATIONALIZATION,
EXPROPRIATION, OR REQUISITIONING OF THE PROPERTY OF
ALIENS
Just as there is little disagreement over a state's sovereign right
to dispose of the property of aliens as it sees fit, so is there a general
consensus concerning that state's obligation to compensate dispossessed
foreign owners for their property losses. The period following World
War I has seen frequent incidents of nationalization, expropriation, or
requisitioning of private, foreign-owned property, and, practically with-
out exception, host nations have recognized their responsibility to com-
pensate in some way for the assets taken.7" Martin Domke concluded
.from his research:
The duty of a government to compensate in cases of nationalization
is almost universally recognized. This is clearly shown by the texts
of the nationalization laws of Iran, Egypt, Indonesia, and Cuba,
expressly providing for compensation, though each in a different
way. Even in the state practice of Communist countries, the obli-
gation to pay compensation has not yet been denied, but recognized
in treaties with other Communist countries and in arrangements
with Western countries ....- 13
The general harmony on this issue has led most authorities to main-
tain that a state's responsibility in instances of nationalization or expro-
priation of private property is an international legal obligation.7" More-
71. See Versiones Oficiales del Senado, from 312a Legislatura, Sesi6n 26a, Jan.
20, 1971, to 313a Legislatura, Sesi6n del Congreso Pleno, July 11, 1971, in El Mercurio
(Santiago), Jan. 23, 1971, at 8, col. 1, to July 13, 1971, at 9, col. 1.
72. The early nationalization of foreign property in the Soviet Union was a
unique exception to this standard. In 1917, the Soviet Union initiated a large-scale
socialization process calling for the nationalization of whole sectors of the economy
regardless of ownership. At that time, the Soviets recognized no liability on their
part to compensate for the property taken in the social reform. The Western nations
hardly considered the Soviets' actions to be legitimate, however, and in 1918 twenty
official protests were lodged against the Soviet Union for the alleged confiscations of
private property. Three years later, the 1921 Brussels Conference on Russia formally
declared the Soviet nationalization an irrefutable breach of international law and
"at variance with the practice of civilized states." B. WORTLEY, EXPROPRIATION IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 115-35 (1959).
73. Domke, Foreign Nationalizations - Some Aspects of Contemporarv Inter-
national Law, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 603-04 (1961).
74. See, e.g., Garcia-Amador, (Fourth) Report on International Responsibility,
(1959] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COmm'N 16-19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/119 (1959).
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over, the studies of the United Nations Commission on Permanent Sov-
ereignty Over Natural Resources led the General Assembly to concur
in Resolution 1803 that "[i]n such cases the owners shall be paid ap-
propriate compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the State
taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance
with international law."75
A. The United States Position: Prompt, Adequate, and
Effective Compensation"
The United States has consistently maintained that, in accordance
with generally accepted principles of international law, the taking of the
property of an alien for public use is "lawful" only if there are reason-
able provisions for the determination and payment of "just compensa-
tion." In its view, just compensation must be "prompt, adequate, and
effective" and must represent the "going concern" value of the assets
taken. The "going concern" value, in contrast to the book value, in-
cludes the aggregate of intangibles, such as technology, experience, sales
markets, profitability, and clientele, all of which account for an enter-
prise's market value and which usually enhance its worth. Book value,
on the other hand, simply represents the actual real value of the assets
under consideration. In the words of the United States Department
of State:
The Department of State has traditionally defined fair com-
pensation as adequate, prompt and effective payment. This defi-
nition can acquire precision only in terms of a particular set of
facts. In the case of an operating enterprise, adequate compen-
sation is usually considered to be an amount representing the
market value or "going concern" value of the enterprise, calcu-
lated as if the expropriation or other governmental act decreasing
the value of the business had not occurred and was not threatened."
With regard to the effectiveness of payment, the State Department
maintains that:
The United States has not accepted the principle which has been
urged by some countries that payment in local currency as a gen-
eral matter meets the standard of prompt, adequate and effective
compensation. Whether local currency payment is effective com-
75. G.A. Res. 1803, pt. 4, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962). See text accompanying note 63 supra.
76. The reader will find this section mercifully brief. The position of the United
States on this matter has been developed extensively in numerous sources. See, e.g.,
note 158 infra.
77. J. Rehm, Ass't Legal Advisor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
Expropriation of American Investments Abroad (Memo of Nov. 19, 1962, M.S. File
200.11/11-1962), in 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1143 (1967).
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pensation depends upon all of the circumstances of the case, i.e.,
the convertibility of the currency, whether or not it is useful to
the foreign owner for new investment within the country . 78
Finally, prompt compensation is normally understood to imply pay-
ment of indemnification as soon as it is reasonable under the circum-
stances, although a promise of payment should be made at the outset.
This does not necessarily entail immediate payment or, for that matter,
full payment at one time.79
Perhaps the best known, though certainly not the earliest, state-
ment establishing the position of the United States is found in an ex-
change of diplomatic notes between former Secretary of State Cordell
Hull and Mexico's Foreign Minister in the late 1930's." ° In a dispute
between the two countries occasioned by Mexico's extensive national-
ization of agricultural properties owned by United States nationals
and by the subsequent delays of indemnification proceedings, Secre-
tary Hull advised the Mexican government:
[U]nder every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled
to expropriate private property, for whatever purpose, without
provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment therefor.
In addition, clauses appearing in the constitutions of almost all
nations today, and in particular in the constitutions of the Amer-
ican republics, embody the principle of just compensation."'
The United States has steadfastly struggled to uphold this rather
strict interpretation of what it has considered a "minimum interna-
tional standard of justice" around the world and has signed agree-
ments with several dozen nations to assure the payment of prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation in the event either country has
need to nationalize, expropriate, or requisition the other's assets. 2
78. Metzer, Ass't Legal Advisor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State(Aug. 1, 1951, Dep't of State File 251.1141/8-151), in 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1183 (1967).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 189 (1965)
Payment with reasonable promptness means payment as soon as it is reasonable
under the circumstances in the light of the international standard of justice ....
The comments to this section explain that a nationalizing state need not pay "immedi-
ately," although some provision for future payments must be made. Payments must
be made as soon as possible, but not necessarily in one sum. Id., comment a at 569.
80. Officials in the State Department's International Claims Division who were
questioned in conjunction with research for this Article suggested that former Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull's memoranda to the Mexican Foreign Minister (see 3 G.
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-63 (1942)) plainly state the
position of the United States with regard to the Chilean nationalizations. In keeping
with generally accepted State Department policy, sources consulted with regard to
this research have requested that their names be withheld.
81. Letter from Secretary of State Hull to the Mexican Foreign Minister, Aug.
22, 1938, in 3 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 80, at 658-59.
82. Among those nations currently bound by such accords with the United States
are: Belgium, the Republic of China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iran,
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Support for the position adopted by the United States may be
found in a number of cases which evidence acceptance of the "prompt,
adequate, and effective" standard in some interstate practice."3 In
1928, for instance, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated,
in the Factory at Chorzow (Merits) case, 4 that a government must pay
"fair compensation," or the "just price of what was expropriated."8 5 In
the court's estimation, just compensation, when the right to expropriate
existed, would be the "value of the undertaking at the moment of dis-
possession, plus interest to the day of payment."8"
Similarly, the United States-Germany Mixed Claims Commission,
examining claims of property damage following World War I, deter-
mined:
[I]n all claims based on property taken and not returned to the
private owner the measure of damages which will ordinarly be ap-
plied is the reasonable market value . . . if it had such market
value .... 87
The Lena Goldfields, Ltd. case" is sometimes referred to as a classic
example of state responsibility in cases of nationalized or expropriated
mining property. 9 In 1925, the English-owned Lena Goldfields com-
pany was granted a concession by the Soviet government to conduct
mining operations in the Soviet Union. In 1929, however, the socialist
regime found it necessary to revoke the concession due to policies which
conflicted with the first Soviet five-year plan. The company thereupon
invoked an arbitration clause which had been included in the concession
agreement, and a tribunal was convened to hear the case. Although the
Soviets at first consented to the arbitration, they later refused to be a
party to the hearings. The tribunal, nonetheless, continued to consider
the matter, and eventually recommended that the private company be
awarded damages based on the fair purchase price as a going concern,
which would include the present value of all of the future profits to be
derived from the mine.9"
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and South
Vietnam. For the precise terms of such accords, see 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1087-89 (1967).
83. See note 286 infra.
84. [1928] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 17.
85. Id. at 47.
86. Id. The court noted that in a case where the right to expropriate did not
exist, compensation should be greater than merely the value at the time of taking.
87. Administrative Decision No. III, Mixed Claims Commission (United States
v. Germany), in 2 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1528-29 (1937).
88. Lena Goldfields, Ltd. (Great Britain v. the Soviet Union) (arbitral award
and decision published in The Times (London), Sept. 3, 1930) ; see 36 CORNELL L.Q.
42-53 (1950).
89. See WORTLEY, supra note 72.
90. Expropriation, supra note 1, at 74. For a discussion of methods of valuation,
see R. LEWIS & G. CLARK, ELEMENTS OF MINING 356-69 (3d ed. 1964).
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In several cases, even nations which have not formally accepted the
United States' "prompt, adequate, and effective" formula have provided
compensation representing the full "market value" of the nationalized
assets. Perhaps the most recent example was the extensive nationaliza-
tion of foreign-owned properties in Tanzania in 1967. The socialist-
oriented legislation undertaking these nationalization reforms provided
for "full and fair compensation" to dispossessed owners; "full value" of
the affected concerns was calculated according to the "net value of the
assets taken over." 1
Thus, it is apparent that the United States has not stood alone in its
assessment of state responsibility in the taking of private assets. But, as
the world's poorer nations have progressively gained political and eco-
nomic strength vis-A.-vis the wealthy capital-exporting nations, so have
they more boldly attempted to assert their own rights as nation-states.
Consequently, many decisions and rulings of recent decades have pro-
vided terms of indemnification more favorable to the nationalizing states.
Moreover, as will be discussed later, compensation agreements in future
instances of nationalization of foreign assets are not expected to meet
United States criteria for just compensation. 2
The Chilean nationalization of the large foreign-owned mines is a
case in point. In accordance with its own interpretation of existing in-
ternational law, the Chilean government has constructed compensation
provisions for the affected companies which incorporate specific princi-
ples of social justice.93 Although the indemnification awards are far
from being satisfactory to United States interests, the Chilean govern-
ment is confident that it has not overstepped current international legal
bounds.
94
B. The Chilean Position
1. No Prevailing and Compelling Minimum Standards
Chile unhesitatingly recognizes its obligation to compensate for-
eign nationals whose property has been nationalized, expropriated, or
otherwise requisitioned by the State for public use. 5 Moreover, recog-
nition of this national responsibility has long been a feature of Chile's
91. Note, Tanzanian Nationalizations: 1967-1970, 4 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 59, 66(1970).
92. See text accompanying notes 286-88 infra.
93. See Law No. 17,450, July 16, 1971.
94. See note 3 supra.
95. When the legislative proposal to be sent to Congress to amend the Constitu-
tion was originally signed by the Chief Executive in Santiago's Plaza de ]a Con-
stituci6n, Allende stated:
I want it to be perfectly well understood that this is not an act of aggression
against the people of North America or against the North American government,
nor is it at all aggressive. We are going to apply the law and to indemnify
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internal laws, and was incorporated into the original draft of Chile's
present Constitution in 1925. While recognizing the eminent right
of the State to expropriate private property, the 1925 Constitution
required that "indemnification" for property taken be set by mutual
consent or "appropriate court proceedings," and that such "indemni-
fication" be paid in advance. 6 This provision was amended in 1967
to make the "social function" of property clearer, by specific mention
of the State's preeminent interest in its natural resources, and to elimi-
nate the requirement of payment in advance." Yet, as amended, the
provision retained recognition of the obligation to compensate an owner
of expropriated property, noting that he "shall always have the right
to compensation, the amount and terms of payment of which shall be
equitably determined by taking into consideration the interests of the
community and of the expropriated owner. "98
The Allende government has taken the position that there are
no prevailing and compelling standards to be found in prior edicts of
international law which effectively serve to define just compensation."
Indeed, General Assembly Resolution 1803,0 the purpose of which
was, in part, to express existing international law on the issue of
according to what is just through the normal Chilean State institutions and the
businesses themselves.
Address by President Allende, Dec. 21, 1970, in El Siglo (Santiago), Dec. 23, 1970,
at 7, col. 1.
96. CONSTITucI6N POLITIcA art. 10, no. 10, para. 1 (Chile, 1925). Prior to the
1967 amendment (see note 98 and accompanying text infra), art. 10, no. 10 of the
Constituci6n Politica read:
No one can be deprived of property under his control, nor of any part thereof,
nor of the right he may have therein, except by virtue of a judicial decree or a
writ of expropriation on account of public interest, conformable to a law. In this
case indemnification, as may be agreed on, or as may be fixed by appropriate
court proceedings, shall be paid the owner in advance.
The exercise of the right of property is subject to the limitation or rules that
the maintenance and advancement of social order demand, and, in this sense, the
law may impose obligations or servitudes for public benefit in favor of the general
interests of the State, of the health of the citizenry and of the public welfare.
97. Law No. 16,617, Jan. 18, 1967, amended art. 10, no. 10 of the Constituci6n
Politica to read:
The law may prescribe the manner in which property is to be acquired, used,
enjoyed, and disposed of and the limitations on obligations thereon which ensure
its social function and render it accessible to all. The social function of property
includes whatever may be required by the general interests of the State, public
benefits and health, a better utilization of the productive sources and energies
in the service of the community, and a raising of the living conditions of the
people as a whole.
Whenever the interests of the national community so demand, the law may
reserve to the State exclusive domain over natural resources, productive goods or
others, declared to be of preeminent importance to the economic, social, or cultural
life of the country.
98. CONSTITucI6N POLiTICA art. 10, no. 10, para. 3 (Chile, 1925, amended 1967).
99. See, e.g., Confiscation, supra note 3, at 77. "Nor can the defense counsel
invoke the principles of International Law. None has been violated, just as none
can be found. ... Id.
100. See G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962).
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sovereignty over natural resources in a more vigorous and compre-
hensive form, simply states that compensation to dispossessed owners
must be "appropriate.''0
The Resolution very significantly makes no mention of the
"prompt, adequate, and effective" formula defended by the United
States, nor does it indicate that "appropriate" compensation must rep-
resent the "going-concern" value of the assets taken. During debate
on Resolution 1803, the United States attempted to change the phras-
ing of point 4 to coincide with its traditional stance, but the proposed
amendment was summarily rejected in favor of the present wording. 102
Instead, the resolution only recommended that "appropriate" compen-
sation be determined "in accordance with the rules in force in the State
taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accord-
ance with international law."' 0 3
The United States has suffered an even more recent- disavowal of
its "prompt, adequate, and effective" maxim. During the first four
months of 1972, Chile endeavored to renegotiate a large portion of the
$3 billion external debt which it had disastrously accumulated in the
past.0 Present at the renegotiating conferences held in Paris were
Chile's creditors from the United States, Japan, and 11 western-
European nations.' American negotiators wedged into the talks a
consideration of the unfavorable terms of compensation Chile had
offered to the nationalized copper companies and further insisted that
any rescheduling of Chile's debt must include more favorable terms
of compensation to be granted to the mining companies.0 6 Quite ex-
pectedly, Chile's negotiators, headed by then-Ambassador Letelier,
refused to be budged by such leverage. The United States eventually
withdrew its demand and instead sought a promise of "prompt, ade-
quate, and effective" compensation in the event of future Chilean
nationalization of foreign-owned properties within its territory. How-
ever, these terms were once again found unacceptable by the Chilean
negotiators and were eventually renounced in favor of an agreement
more palatable to all parties concerned.' 7 The final accords, as adopted
on April 20, 1972, thus stated that the Chilean authorities "confirmed
their policies of recognition and of payment of all foreign debt and
101. Id.
102. See 17 U.N. GAOR, 2d Comm. 233-34 (1962).
103. G.A. Res. 1803, pt. 4, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/5217(1962).
104. See Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1972, at A8, col. 1.
105. Id.
106. N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1972, at 3, col. 4.
107. Id.
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their acceptance of the principles of payment of just compensation for all
nationalizations in accordance with Chilean and international law."'' s
The posture adopted by Chile at this time was very much akin to
the position of the Mexican government during its nationalization re-
form programs of the 1930's. During that particular controversy, in
which Secretary of State Cordell Hull formally made reference to the
United States' "prompt, adequate, and effective" formula for com-
pensation, the Mexican Foreign Minister replied:
My government maintains .. . that there is in international law
no rule universally accepted in theory nor carried out in practice,
which makes obligatory the payment of immediate compensation
nor even of deferred compensation, for expropriations of a gen-
eral and impersonal character like those which Mexico has
carried out for the purpose of redistribution of the land ...
...Nevertheless Mexico admits, in obedience to her own
laws, that she is indeed under obligation to indemnify in an ade-
quate manner, but the doctrine which she maintains on the sub-ject, which is based on the most authoritative opinions of writers
of treatises on international law, is that the time and manner
of such payment must be determined by her own laws. l09
Eventually, several joint Mexican-American Claims Commissions were
established to rule on matters of just compensation for dispossessed
North American property owners. Final indemnification agreements
were often considerably lower than the original claims, although in
the case of the petroleum industries, compensation was calculated ac-
cording to the "standard American valuation based upon prudent in-
vestment theory.""'  Standard Oil of New Jersey, for instance, had
originally claimed that the net worth of its Mexican holdings was
$400 million."' Nonetheless, when compensation was forthcoming
in 1941, the joint Claims Commission had calculated the worth of the
company at closer to $18.4 million, and Standard accepted this 95 per
cent reduction in its original claim." 2
Similar precedential cases in which less than full compensation
has been accepted in complete satisfaction of claims of property losses
are plentiful, particularily in the post-World War II years. In fact,
the volume of such evidence easily serves to substantiate the opinion
108. Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1972, at A8, col. 1. See Wash. Post, Apr. 21, 1972, at
A28, col. 1.
109. Letter from the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs to United States Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull, Apr. 3, 1938, in 3 G. HACKWORTH, supra note 80, at 657-58.
110. J. WILKIE & A. MICHAELS, REVOLUTION IN MEXICO: YEARS OF UPHEAVAL,
1910-1940, at 241 (1969).
111. Id. at 241-42.
112. Id.
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held by Chilean authorities that no compelling or prevailing legal
standards exist within the edicts of international law which serve to
clearly define "just" compensation. The common occurrence and ac-
ceptance of such compensatory provisions as reduced and partial pay-
ments, lump-sum agreements, deferred payments, and payments in
non-interest bearing government bonds manifest the flexibility of
the applicable international standards. In view of this evidence, an un-
published study by the Department of the Treasury concluded in 1970
that recent compensation settlements have been "based on the recog-
nition of a community of interests, rather than on the application of
principles of international law." ' 8
The extensive nationalization programs enacted during the social-
ization of Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1950 were perhaps the
first large-scale actions which brought into question the policy that
compensation must be "prompt, adequate, and effective" and must
reflect the "going concern" value of nationalized private foreign assets.
In the relevant deliberations over compensation, the socialist states
universally argued that the concept of social justice, which had moti-
vated their sovereign acts in the first place, not only limited the extent
of their obligation to pay, but also justified the calculation of indemni-
fication based on a state's ability to pay. 1 4 Most of the settlements
arranged with American interests were "lump-sum" agreements paid
out of foreign assets blocked in the United States."' Generally, the
indemnity paid represented only a small fraction of the amount claimed
by the affected foreign property owners. In Poland, for example, al-
though American claims for nationalized private assets exceeded $680
million, only $40 million was eventually paid in full settlement of the
claims." 6 Rumania paid United States nationals a total of $30.5 mil-
tion, which was considered a sizeable sum, given that the total of
awarded claims against Rumania amounted to almost $60 million."'
During the same period, an agreement between the United States and
Yugoslavia resulted in payment of $17 million. Although this sum
was only 42.5 per cent of the original claim, the American govern-
ment eventually acknowledged that $17 million would cover the fair
value of the claims."'
113. R. Vega, Expropriation, at 88, June 1, 1970 (unpublished U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury Memorandum).
114. Cf. Doman, Postwar Nationalizations of Foreign Property in Europe, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (1948).
115. R. Vega, supra note 113, at 41-47; Rafat, supra note 61, at 212-15.
116. R. Vega, supra note 113, at 43.
117. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 88TH CONG., IST SESS.,
REPORT ON CLAIMS PROGRAM ADMINISTERED 13Y THE FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT
COMMISSION UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT OF 1949, AS
AMENDED (Comm. Print 1963).
118. R. Vega, supra note 113, at 41-43.
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Settlements have not yet been reached with all of the Eastern
European nations, however. The latest negotiations with Czecho-
slovakia were discontinued in 1968."' Approximately 5.3 per cent of
the American claims filed against Czechoslovakia were paid from an
available fund of $8.5 million. 2° Negotiations with Hungary are still
in progress with no agreement having been reached to date. Hun-
garian assets which were frozen in the United States amount to only
$1.6 million, while claims for nationalization of private property in
Hungary total some $58 million. 2' The Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the United States have endeavored only within the last
few months to resume negotiations on the Soviet debt to the United
States stemming from the early lend-lease agreements and war debts.'22
The socialized Eastern European nations were not alone in pro-
tecting their national interests with regard to compensation settlements
following World War 1I. In Western Europe, both France and Great
Britain managed to arrange partial payment settlements with nation-
alized property owners in those nations.' 2 Between 1944 and 1946,
the French government nationalized the Renault Company (1944),
the Bank of France (1945), the commercial banks (1945), the air
transportation industry (1945), the coal industry (1946), the electric
and gas industries (1946), and the Securities and insurance companies
(1946). Prior to taking these measures, the French government
recognized its obligation to compensate for this nationalized property,
part of which was foreign-owned. Nonetheless, in the final analysis,
only partial compensation was paid in settlement of the claims.' 24 In
the case of the Bank of France, a total of 28,000 francs was indemni-
fied to shareholders in the bank. However, according to the bank's
own accounts, normal liquidation was estimated to be near 70,000
francs, although this sum was later reduced to 44,000 francs when the
bank's "dubious" methods of evaluation were questioned. 25
In the case of the commercial banks, compensation "was to be
based on the average market value for the period from September 1,
1944, to October 31, 1945, a period during which the nationalization
of the banks had become a certainty."' 26 In other words, indemnifi-
cation to the shareholders in these commercial banks was equal to
119. Id. at 44.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 45.
122. Interview with officials of the Economic and Business Bureau of the U.S.
Dep't of State, in Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 1972.
123. For additional discussion of these nationalizations, see Rafat, supra note 61,
at 209-11.
124. M. EINAUDI, M. BYE & E. Rossi, NATIONALIZATION IN FRANCE AND ITALY
76-77 (1955).
125. Id. at 40.
126. Id.
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the worth of the banks more than a year after the announcement of
nationalization had been made. During this period, market values
dropped considerably.'27 On at least one occasion, the French govern-
ment even found it in its interest to employ retroactive measures; spe-
cifically, the nationalization of the French air transport industries was
enacted on February 9, 1945, but was deemed effective as of Septem-
ber 1, 1944.12s
During these same years, Britain's government felt it within the
national interest to nationalize the coal (1946), electric (1947), and
steel (1949) industries, as well as the railroads (1947) and airlines
(1939 & 1946) 129 As in France, the market value of nationalized
concerns was calculated according to the value of the stock in Novem-
ber 1946, well after the prospective nationalization of the enterprises
had been assured and the value of the affected shares had consequently
dropped.1 80
Examining the nationalization programs in Britain and France,
Konstantin Katzarov has concluded:
In considering the compensation of parties affected by national-
ization in England and France in general, it must be admitted
that it has been neither [prior nor full]. Moreover, care is taken
not to reveal openly this attitude, which may well have been
dictated by ideological considerations, and attempts have been
made to camouflage it."'
The Mideast has traditionally been considerably less accommo-
dating to its creditors than has Western Europe. In nationalizing the
Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal, for example, Presi-
dent Nassar of Egypt charged that his country was receiving only 44
per cent of the net profits from the canal, although the essential water-
way runs through Egyptian territory." 2 As an exercise of its national
sovereignty, Egypt nationalized the canal in 1956 and took the com-
pany's operations into its own hands. Although the nationalization'
decree had provided for compensation based on the value of the com-
127. Rafat, supra note 61, at 210.
128. K. KATZAROV, THEORY OF NATIONALIZATION 44 (English ed. 1964).
129. See generally Schmitthoff, The Nationalization of Basic Industries in Great
Britain, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 557 (1951).
130. See Cairns, Some Legal Aspects of Compensation for Nationalized Assets,
16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 594 (1951).
131. K. KATZAROV, supra note 128, at 328-29. Certainly there are conflicting
opinions concerning the French and British post-war nationalization experiences.
Professor Weston concluded that the French claims commissions appeared generally
to have striven for a distribution based on the net market or going concern value
extant ordinarily at the time of loss. B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POST-WAR
FRENCH PRACTICE (1971). Professor Lillich similarly claims that the British Foreign
Compensation Commission respected a standard of evaluation based on going concern
value. R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: POST-WAR BRITISH PRACTICE (1967).
132. See Rafat, supra note 61, at 233.
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pany's stock on the Paris Stock Exchange on the day before the na-
tionalization actually took place, a fi'al settlement was reached only
after the conflict evolved into armed hostilities. Not until July 13,
1958, was an agreement reached between Egypt and Universal's stock-
holders, whereby the stockholders received E£ 28.3 million in addition
to the external assets of the company. 8 ' This sum amounted to ap-
proximately 25 per cent of the EL 130 million originally claimed by
the nationalized company.'
In Latin America, compensation negotiations in cases of nation-
alization have sometimes favored the interests of the nationalized
parties. This has often been due to the close economic and political de-
pendence of these nations on the major capital-exporting countries. For
example, when the revolutionary government of former President
Ovando in Bolivia nationalized the nation's three largest tin mining
companies in 1952, the government effected full indemnification of the
foreign entrepreneurs. It is generally conceded that the relatively gen-
erous terms of compensation in this case had a great deal to do with
Bolivia's dependence on American and British tin smelting plants,
necessary for the processing of Bolivia's raw metal.' 3
The Gulf Oil Company, on the other hand, did not enjoy such
favorable treatment when the Bolivian government nationalized its
assets on October 17, 1969. A compensation settlement was announced
on September 10, 1970, which decreed that Bolivia would pay Gulf
$78.6 million in installments, from 25 per cent of the future profits
from the operation of the former Gulf installations. Although Gulf
had estimated its net worth between $120-30 million, the settlement
was considered "fair and equitable under the circumstances."'3 6
Finally, the Cuban nationalizations of North American proper-
ties should be discussed briefly. Following Fidel Castro's rise to power
in 1958, the Cuban government moved to terminate foreign control
over the island's economy. One of the first acts in the socialization of
Cuba was to nationalize the country's sugar plantations, the majority
of which were North American-owned.' The Agrarian Reform Act
of May 17, 1959,'s assured the owners of nationalized agricultural
properties an indemnification based upon the real book value of the
land, plus improvements, to be paid in twenty-year bonds at 4y per
cent interest. To cover the indemnification awards, the Cubans set
133. Id. at 237.
134. See R. Vega, supra note 113, at 82-83.
135. Id. at 52-58; Research Study, supra note 50, at 21-22.
136. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1970, at 35, col. 4.
137. See Rafat, supra note 61, at 245.
138. Act of May 17, 1959, 2 LA JURISPRUDENCIA AL DiA (Lw-sIcACI6N) 933(1959).
MARCH 1973]
25
Fleming: The Nationalization of Chile's Large Copper Companies in Contempo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
aside $100 million in tax-exempt bonds. The sugar plantations being
nationalized, however, were valued at roughly $250 million.139 The
United States Department of State expressed "concern ... with regard
to the adequacy of the provision for compensation," and immediately
deemed the arrangement unsatisfactory to American interests. 4 °
On July 6, 1960, relations between the United States and Cuba
took an abrupt turn for the worse when President Eisenhower called
for a 95 per cent reduction in Cuba's remaining 1960 sugar quota, the
island's primary source of foreign revenue.' 4 ' The Cuban government
responded to this blatant economic pressure on the same day by na-
tionalizing all American-owned property in Cuba. 142 According to this
broad nationalization law, compensation was to be paid in cash up to
$10,000 and in Cuban bonds for all sums exceeding that amount. The
National Bank of Cuba was assigned the task of determining the spe-
cific amount of compensation to be paid. 14  This compensatory pro-
vision was again found unacceptable by United States interests. None-
theless, Cuba refused to alter its legislative provisions, arguing that
years of imperialistic exploitation of its resources had driven its econ-
omy into a "chaotic economic and financial situation.' 1 44 Furthermore,
Cuban authorities maintained that the overwhelmingly unfavorable
balance of payments between the United States and Cuba, which had
been inherited by the new government, prohibited by prior payment
of the proper indemnification in cash, in an amount judicially deter-
mined, as required by the Cuban Constitution. 45
The 'United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba after
the Cuban government demanded on January 3, 1961, that the United
States' Embassy staff be reduced to eleven officials.' 40 Subsequently,
all Cuban assets in the United States were frozen.' 47 To date, over
8000 claims, exceeding $3.3 billion, have been filed against the Cuban
government pursuant to the Cuban Claims Act, 4 although no nego-
tiations between the two countries have taken place.' 49 Moreover, with
139. R. Vega, supra note 113, at-
140. U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 417, June 11, 1959, in 40 DEP'T STATEBULL. 958, 959 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Press Release].
141. Exec. Proclamation No. 3,355, 3 C.F.R. 80 (1963).
142. Law No. 851, July 6, 1960, 2 LA JURISPRUDENCIA AL DiA (LEGISLAcI6N)
1162 (1960).
143. See Rafat, supra note 61, at 249.
144. Unpublished Cuban note of June 15, 1969, in Rafat, supra note 61, at 247.
145. Press Release, supra note 140, at 958.
146. See R. Vega, supra note 113, at 51.
147. See 31 C.F.R. § 515 (Supp. 1971). It has been estimated that the total value
of realizable assets frozen was $60 million. See Re, The Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission and the Cuban Claims Program, 1 INT'L LAw. 81, 82 n.3 (1966).
148. 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1970).
149. R. Vega, supra note 113, at 52.
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official relations between the states almost entirely severed, there is
little chance that negotiations might be resumed in the near future.
The examples of indemnification settlements cited above tend to
reaffirm the principle that a state is obligated to compensate foreign
owners if it unilaterally takes away their property. However, the
precedents do not clearly bring to light any coherent norm which
might serve as a guide in determining the indemnification due in any
specific case.
2. State Responsibility to Formulate Terms of Indemnification
The Allende government reasoned that if international law lays
bare no definition of "just" compensation, responsibility to formulate.
the terms of indemnification logically falls upon the nationalizing
state. 5 ' Allende relied upon General Assembly Resolution 1803 in
support of this stand and set about to construct adequate guidelines
for the calculation of "appropriate" indemnification in the specific.
cases of the Gran Mineria and Andina mines.""
a. "Less than Full Compensation:" Social Justice and
Ability to Pay
The overriding consideration in Chile's search for an appropriate
formula for compensation was the belief that the act of nationalization
was primarily a means of securing social justice. Essentially, the na-
tionalizations were understood as an effort by the Government to
restore to public ownership assets of superior import to the Chilean
people which had been "unjustly" held and exploited by foreign entre-
preneurs. This viewpoint was succinctly expressed in a Chilean gov-
ernment brief resisting review of excess profits deductions, in which
the Government argued that the issue should be analyzed from:
the point of view of countries which have the urgent necessity of
achieving economic independence in order to obtain a better de.-
velopment of the human communities constituting them ....
Respect for acquired rights is nothing more than a different
version of social immobility which is expressed in the psuedo-
principle of the unity of action of the States. It tends to affirm
the consolidated situations of some private persons, completely
ignoring the most elemental principle of justice which demands
150. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
151. Cf. Letter from Francisco Orrego Vincuna, Professor of Public International
Law, University of Chile, Santiago, to the author, Sept. 6, 1971 [hereinafter cited as
Orrego Letter].
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taking care of the necessities of others who have not consolidated
their situation in any way and which they need to do in order
to be able to say that they live in a humanly decorous situation.
152
This argument, which evoked an element of social justice, evolved
into the legal notion that a state's responsibility to compensate owners
of nationalized concerns is somehow mitigated if the act has been
inspired by a concept of social justice and if its purpose is to increase
public ownership rights on a large scale.
Furthermore, Chilean legislators insisted upon differentiating
"nationalization" from "expropriation.' 5 ' Apparently, no real at-
tempt to distinguish these two terms had actually been made until the
post-World War II era when the concept of nationalization came into
wide usage with the socialization programs in Eastern Europe.
154
The conditions created by the war and the political and nationalistic
demands of reconstruction required a new conception of the "social
function" of property. "Nationalization" during this period generally
began to connote expropriations carried out in the public interest.
15
Within the past three decades, a number of international legal
authorities have come to recognize a legal distinction between acts of
nationalization and expropriation. 15  Katzarov, one of the foremost
authorities in this area of international law, has concluded:
[T]he evolution of law confirms beyond doubt not only a new
attitude towards property allowing nationalisation to be regarded
as a new legal institution, but also a very clear distinction between
expropriation of the classical type, and nationalisation, as a means
of converting private property into the property of the people of
the State.
This finding makes it impossible to hold that the problems
connected with nationalisation can necessarily be considered and
solved in the same way as those arising out of expropriation, or
any analogy therewith. 5 7
However, more precise definitions of the terms "nationalization"
and "expropriation" have never been decidely elaborated within the
writs of international law. Generally speaking, the term "nationaliza-
152. Confiscation, supra note 3, at 76-77.
153. Orrego Letter, supra note 151.
154. See generally K. KATZAROV, supra note 128. Prior to 1945, most legislation
concerning government takings of private property was composed in terms of
"expropriations" and "confiscations" (expropriation without appropriate compensa-
tion), with the exception of the socialization programs in the U.S.S.R. after 1917.
See note 72 supra.
155. See, e.g., Garcia-Amador, (Fifth) Report on International Responsibility,
[1960] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/125 (1960).
156. Id.
157. K. KATZAROV, supra note 128, at 147.
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tion" is gradually evolving to imply that the act in question is moti-
vated by the overall best interests of the community, with the expressed
purpose of placing in public hands certain assets which are of superior
importance to the community at large. Furthermore, the act generally
encompasses entire economic undertakings, activities, and material
assets. 58
It is interesting to note that the legal concept of nationalization
was only first introduced into the text of the Chilean nationalization
amendment after the original drafts had been submitted for study to
the Senate Committee on the Constitution, Legislation, Justice, and
Rules. Although at first each Senator studying the project in Com-
mittee felt that there was no significant difference between nationaliza-
tion and expropriation, and that nationalization was merely a more
politically acceptable term, further investigation of legal opinions re-
vealed that nationalization might well be considered an action separate
and distinct from expropriation according to evolving norms of inter-
national law.' 59 When the proposed amendment was brought before
the Senate one month later, its wording had been revised to eliminate
all references to "expropriation" and instead it termed the constitu-
tional amendment an act of "nationalization." Although discussions
concerning the use of the term extended into both Senate and House
floor debates, the revised wording of the Committee was eventually
fully retained.'8 0
Particularly in the Chilean situation, distinctions between the
terms nationalization and expropriation should not be viewed as
merely semantical differences. As mentioned above, the nationalization
of the nation's large mines was motivated by a consideration for the
overall interests of the community. Its purpose was to place under
public control certain assets which were considered to be essential to
Chile's national welfare; the term "nationalization" was thus employed
by the Chilean legislators specifically because it was felt that the word
connoted a sense of social justice. 8 '
The Chilean legislators further maintained that their responsi-
bility to foreign entrepreneurs was conditioned by their righteous pur-
pose - to rectify injustices suffered by their society while their re-
sources were under foreign control. They reasoned that no nation
158. See generally I. FOIGHEL, NATIONALIZATION (1956); S. FRIEDMAN, EXPRO-
PRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 140-41 (I. Jackson trans. 1953); G. WHITE,
NATIONALISATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY 41-45 (1961).
159. Orrego Letter, supra note 151.
160. See, e.g., Versi6n Extractada Oficial, 312a Legislatura Sesi6n 31 Especial,
Feb. 2, 1971, in El Mercurio (Santiago), Feb. 5, 1971, at 6, col. 1.
161. Orrego Letter, supra note 151.
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has the right to jeopardize social justice by paying an indemnity so
high as to be detrimental to the interests of the community.
162
Moreover, this interpretation of responsibility based on social
justice did not originate with the Chilean nationalizations. Numerous
international authorities have suggested that the obligations incurred
by a "nationalizing" state might very well be considered separate from
those obligations incurred by a state "expropriating" private prop-
erty.1 63 In fact, such a distinction as to state responsibility has, to some
extent, already been institutionalized. Garcia-Amador, Special Rap-
porteur of the International Law Commission Responsible for the
Codification of the Laws of State Responsibility, has suggested a dis-
tinction between "the common types of expropriation and nationaliza-
tion measures, a distinction which affects in particular the quantum
of compensation and the form and promptness of payment .... 164
The immutable concept of state sovereignty stands as the main
defense of this attitude. To demand that a state sacrifice or jeopardize
its goals merely to satisfy external standards of just compensation
might, in some cases, limit the success of the reform sought. In a
sense then, such a measure would compromise the very sovereignty
of the nationalizing state.'65
Hersh Lauterpacht, writing in the late 1930's was, perhaps, one
of the first to recognize that the terms of compensation for the taking
of private property should fully consider the effects on the nationalizing
or expropriating state. In his 1937 lectures at the Hague Academy of
International Law, Lauterpacht stated:
[I]t is difficult to maintain that expropriation of property
for the purposes of fundamental social reforms must stop short
of the property of aliens. To maintain this would mean to at-
tempt to impose upon States a prohibition to regulate their social
and political life as they are entitled to do by virtue of the inde-
pendence and autonomy recognized by international law. For
the duty of full compensation might in effect mean the frustration
of the contemplated reform. 6 6
162. See generally Confiscation, supra note 3, at 57-82.
163. See, e.g., K. KATZAROV, supra note 128. Katzarov is a leading advocate of
the view that indemnification need be neither prior nor complete in nationalization, as
opposed to expropriation, since entire industries are involved, and the taking is
justified by valid social and economic needs of the state. At one point in the Senate
debates, the President of the Senate, Patricio Alywin, gave up his chair to cite
Katzarov on just this point. See note 160 supra.
164. Garcia-Amador, supra note 155.
165. But see Kissam & Leach, Sovereign Expropriation of Property and Abroga-
tion of Concession Contracts, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 177, 189 (1959).
166. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT
388 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1970).
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Other authorities have since corroborated Lauterpacht's interpreta-
tion of international justice. Professor de la Pradelle has indicated
that the breadth of the act of nationalization might automatically pro-
hibit payment of full compensation and thus suggested that indemni-
fication be "based upon the debtor state's financial capacity, equitably
estimated, with payment spread over a reasonable length of time."'" 7
It has even been suggested that nationalization does not necessitate any
redress whatsoever if compensation would so endanger the successful
completion of the envisioned reform. 6 s
In light of the factors considered above, it is important to note
Chile's ability to pay compensation. Chilean authorities have insisted
that this aspect should enter into any adjudication proceeding involving
indemnification, for the State's current financial situation relates directly
to the question of what measure of compensation justly considers the
community interest. 9 It is no state secret that Chile has sailed into dire
financial straits over the past years; its huge foreign debt of over $3
billion looms unusually large, considering Chile's practically nonexistent
foreign reserve holdings.' 0 In addition, the five nationalized mining
concerns had outstanding debts totaling $728 million at the time of na-
tionalization which Chile, in a statement made by the President of the
State Defense Council in 1971, agreed to assume in full - with the ex-
ception of those investments deemed not to have been invested "usefully."
As of the time of this writing, the Comptroller General's guarantee
still stands.' 7 '
Therefore, given Chile's present financial crisis, some Chilean
officials have argued that the State is indisputably incapable of award-
ing additional compensation to the nationalized companies. To do so
would be to compromise its intended reforms and thereby threaten the
State's sovereignty. In this content, the willingness to absorb the
debts of the mixed copper companies might justifiably be considered a
conciliatory measure. In response to accusations by Secretary of State
167. "[U]ne indemnit6 base sur les possibilities du debiteur raissonablement
consid6r6es, dans un paiement echelonn6 sur un delii normal." 43 ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 20 (1950).
168. 44 II ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 254 (1951).
169. See, e.g., Statements by Eduardo Novoa, CODELCO Press Conference,
Santiago, Oct. 14, 1971 (copy on file at the Villanova Law Review) [hereinafter cited
as CODELCO Press Conference].
170. Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 1972, at A16, col. 1.
171. Statement by Eduardo Novoa, CODELCO Press Conference, supra note 169.
The State Defense Council was assigned the task of defending the interests of the
State before any adjudicatory tribunals. Mr. Novoa also made clear his wish to
investigate further the possibility of subtracting the companies' outstanding debts from
possible compensation awards. Id.
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Rogers that Chile was not abiding by international standards of jus-
tice, Chile's Foreign Minister Almeyda remarked:
[A]I1 adverse criticisms . . . [ignore] the circumstance in which
our country would have to take charge of debts contracted by
the expropriated firms, corresponding to investments now made
172
Almeyda further claimed that Roger's statement "showed an ignor-
ance of the sovereign right of the nation to determine, in accordance
with the Chilean law and Constitution, the amount and means of
fixing" the indemnity.1 73
The Chilean provisions for compensation clearly embodied that
country's bold interpretation of existing international standards of state
responsibility. Several new paragraphs were inserted into the main
text of the Chilean Constitution, establishing the ground rules and
norms to be respected in all future measures taking the property of
private parties. As amended, the relevant language the Constituci6n
Politica reads:
The amount of the compensation, or compensations, as the case
may be, may be determined on the basis of the original cost of
such assets, less amortization, depreciation write-offs (castigos),
and devaluation through obsolescence. All or part of the excess
profits the nationalized companies have obtained may also be de-
ducted from the compensation. Unless the person affected agrees
to some other form of payment, the compensation shall be paid in
legal tender over a period of not more than 30 years and on terms
to be determined by law.1
7 4
In addition to amending the main text of the Constitution, three
transitory articles were added specifically to legislate the national-
ization of the Gran Mineria and Andina.'75 According to the second
of these, a "suitable compensation" must be provided for all "affected"
parties.' 76 "Suitable compensation" is determined by calculating the
base book value of the assets taken on December 31, 1970. Denoting
the book value of the assets as the maximum potential compensation,
a number of possible deductions are then enumerated in the legisla-
tion, which may be subtracted from that figure if found to be applica-
ble. Included in this rather formidable list of possible deductions are
the following:
172. Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1971, at A12, col. 1.
173. Id.
174. CONSTITUcI6N POLITICA art. 10, no. 10, para. (d) (Chile, 1925, amended 1971).
175. CONSTITuci6N POLiTIcA arts. (transitory) 16-18 (1971).
176. CONSTITUcI6N POLITICA art. (transitory) 17 (1971).
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(1) The amount of upward revaluations made by the companies
or their predecessors after December 31, 1964; (2) the worth of
mineral deposits if included in the calculations of book value;
(3) amounts representing assets that the State did not receive in
good operating condition, or which were turned over without
rights to service, repairs, and/or spare parts; (4) amounts rep-
resenting studies, prospecting information, or other compensable
intangible assets turned over without all the titles, maps, reports,
and data making their full utilization possible; (5) amounts due
the Treasury; (6) any amounts receivable that are not paid by
the debtors when due (to be deducted from compensation install-
ments only) ; and (7) payments made by the State or its agencies
for shares of stock acquired by Chilean agencies or by virtue of
the guarantees agreed upon for the said payment obligations. 7
The Comptroller General was assigned the task of determining which
of the deductions listed were to be made and in what amounts, with
the exception of deductions for excessive profits. 7 " The President of
the Republic was given the final responsibility to determine whether
excessive profits had been earned by the companies and whether or
not these should be deducted from the compensation to the owners of
the nationalized companies. 7 9 None of the above-mentioned deduc-
tions was mandatory.
According to the constitutional amendment, any compensation
determined to be owed by Chile was to be paid in installments over a
period of not more than 30 years, at an interest rate of not less than
three per centY.80 The constitutional amendment further stated that
indemnities would be paid in the form of "legal tender unless the
nationalized companies agree to another form of payment."'' In the
case of the Gran Mineria and Andina, "legal tender" has been con-
sidered to mean American dollars.' 2
In compliance with the constitutional mandate, on October 11,
1971, the Comptroller General announced the Chilean government's
decisions and calculations regarding compensation due to each of the
five nationalized concerns. 83 The indemnities in each case were cal-
culated separately. In conformity with the new legislation, the mixed
companies were completely dissolved and all of the companies' assets
were immediately transferred to the State. However, it is important
to note that, in effect, only the 49 per cent privately held interest in
177. Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7.
178. CONSTITUCI6N POLiTICA art. (transitory) 17, § a, para. 1 (1971).
179. Id. § b, para. 1.
180. Id. § d, para. 1.
181. Id.
182. See Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7.
183. Id.
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the El Teniente, Chuquicamata, and El Salvador mines was actually
nationalized. The other 51 per cent had already been effectively ac-
quired by the State under the Frei government's Chileanization pro-
gram." 4 Likewise, only 75 per cent of Ex6tica and 70 per cent of
Andina were owned privately by the North American businesses at
the time of the nationalization.' 5 These prior transactions were not
nullified by the amendment, although the government ultimately re-
jected the previously agreed upon evaluations of the assets concerned.'
The total book value of each of the mines was first computed from
the balance sheets of each of the mixed companies. The paid-in capi-
tal and reserves were added plus or minus the profit or loss for the
fiscal year; from this amount anticipated and paid dividends were
deducted.' s7  The Comptroller General's office next proceeded to in-
vestigate and evaluate the various deductions to be subtracted from
the base book values of the enterprises. To accomplish this task, a De-
partment of Studies was created to coordinate the legal and technical
proceedings.' The initial deductions, announced on October 11,
1971, corresponded to four principal categories of deductions as had
been outlined in the nationalization legislation.
The first deduction was for revaluations after December 31, 1964.
This deduction was aimed specifically at Kennecott's holdings in
Compania Minera El Teniente, because none of the other four mining
enterprises had revaluated their assets since 1964. Kennecott's alleged
revaluation came about as a result of the 1967 transfer of the assets
and liabilities held by Kennecott in its El Teniente mine to the new
mixed company, Compania Minera El Teniente. In this process, the
book value of the mining enterprise had been reassessed in 1965 by
several independent appraisers to establish the real book value of the
company at the time of transfer.' This upward revaluation increased
El Teniente's book value by over $219 million. The newly computed
figure was subsequently approved by the necessary Chilean govern-
184. See text accompanying notes 20-40 supra.
185. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
186. Interview with Claudio Bonnefoy, Legal Advisor, Chilean Embassy, in Wash-
ington, D.C., Sept. 9, 1971 [hereinafter cited as 1971 Bonnefoy Interview].
187. The following book values as of December 31, 1970, were calculated for each
of the companies:
1) Cia. Minera Chuquicamata S.A.. $241,958,862.43
2) Cia. Minera El Salvador S.A $ 68,372,196.57
3) Cia. Minera Ex6tica S.A ........... -.... $ 14,815,052.52
4) Cia. Minera El Teniente S.A .--......... $318,801,198.77
5) Cia. Minera Andina S.A ------- $ 20,145,469.44
Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1251-53.
188. Id. at 1243.
189. In 1967, both the Chilean government and Kennecott, through the Braden
Copper Company, agreed that the revaluation of El Teniente was necessary if Com-
pania Minera El Teniente was to secure financing for the company's new expansion
program. See Kennecott Copper Corporation, supra note 28, at 6-7.
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ment agencies in 1968 and 1969. However, in 1970 CODELCO re-
fused to approve the 1965 revaluated book value, and a final decision
on the matter was postponed until the nationalization of El Teniente
in 1971. At that time, the $219 million upward revaluation which
appeared in Kennecott's books was subtracted from the base book value
of the company)' °
In the second category were deductions for mineral deposits. The
Chilean government assured the American copper companies that they
would refuse to compensate for the actual mineral deposits themselves,
which have always been considered part of Chile's national patrimony.
Therefore, if the value of the ore bodies had been included in the com-
panies' balance sheets, these amounts were deducted from the base book
values calculated by the Comptroller General's Office. However, deduc-
tions for the values of mineral deposits were relatively insignificant.'
The third category encompassed the objections accepted on assets
entitled to compensation. In an effort to facilitate the appraisal of the
assets of the five companies, the Department of Studies engaged several
technical commissions to report on the condition of the companies' assets
in the field. The commissions were at work at the mines by mid-July
1971, at which time official communications also went out to CODELCO
and ENAMI, the Chilean governmental agency regulating small mines,
to obtain data on the tangible and intangible assets necessary for the
efficient operation of the mines."' On August 2, and August 16, two
preliminary lists of assets found in defective condition were submitted
to the Department of Studies; the final investigations were not re-
quested until September 20, 1971.'
To lend international credibility to these investigations, the De-
partment of Studies also called to Chile teams of Soviet and French
mining experts to take part in the evaluations of the private companies'
assets. 94 In September 1971, the reports of these experts were sub-
190. The Comptroller General granted Kennecott a $15 million discount for such
items as depreciated assets. However, the State Defense Council asserted that the
Comptroller General had had no authority to grant a discount of any sort, that the
letter of the constitutional amendment required the full deduction of revaluations made
after 1964, and that there had been no provision in the legislation for such discounts.
The Defense Council, therefore, petitioned that the final deduction be made in the full
amount of the original revaluation. See CODELCO Press Conference, supra note 169;
Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1254.
191. The estimated values of the ore bodies as shown in the balance sheets of the
companies were as follows:
1) Cia. Minera Chuquicamata S.A.---... $5,398,937.59
2) Cia. Minera El Salvador S.A.-.-- $ 353,692.06
3) Cia. Minera Ex6tica S.A ..................... $ 250,000.00
4) Cia. Minera El Teniente S.A.-------- $ 223,519.00
5) Cia. Minera Andina S.A $1,532,176.09
Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1251-53.
192. Id. at 1243-45.
193. Id.
194. Expropriation, supra note 1, at 33.
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mitted to the Comptroller General's office, although their contents were
not immediately made public. Within a few days, however, the re-
ports were leaked from the government's classified files and into the
hands of the press. El Mercurio, the leading opposition newspaper,
quickly published the French report which turned out to be only
mildly critical of the mines under American control. 9 ' The foremost
leftist newspaper, El Siglo, returned the fire immediately by printing
the Soviet study, a much harsher evaluation of the mining concerns.
19 8
In the mud slinging that ensued, the left claimed that the French ex-
perts spent only a short time in Chile and could not have properly
assessed the mines. The opposition retorted that the Soviet engineers
spent the better part of their stay learning the language and filching
technological developments for their use at home.19 7
The findings of the technical commissions were released in the
Comptroller General's statement of October 11. Deductions for assets
received in objectionable condition, calculated according to their values
in the companies' inventories, less depreciation, were not insubstan-
tial. '9s
The fourth and final category included deductions for equity in-
terests previously purchased by the State. These deductions levied
against the nationalized mining companies concerned payment for the
stock purchased by the Frei government several years earlier.199 Thus
far, this deduction has only been formally applied in the specific case
of the installments paid by the Anaconda Company to the Chilean
government, which is still being disputed in the United States courts.2"'
This particular deduction has, in several instances, led to problems
for the Chileans. In the case of the Kennecott Corporation, the entire
51 per cent equity interest which had been purchased by the State in
1967 had been repaid within three years. This share of the El Teniente
mine, which amounted to $80 million, was immediately reloaned to Chile
to help finance El Teniente's expansion programs. With interest, the
loan came to $93 million and was to be repaid over a fifteen year period
beginning December 31, 1971.20' However, on that day, the Chilean
government chose to default on the first installment, delaying further
195. Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1971, at A34, col. 1.
196. Expropriation. supra note 1, at 39.
197. Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1971, at A34, col. 1.
198. 1) Cia. Minera Chi'cuicamata S.A ----------- $13.060,861.91
2) Cia. Minera El Salvador S.A ............ $ 5.596.139.09
3) Cia. M inera Ex6tica S.A . -..................... $ 4.554,607.41
4) Cia. Minera El Teniente S.A$.. 20,520.167.06
5) Cia. Minera Andina S.A..---,-. - $ 343,592.00
Comntroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1251-53.
199. See text accompanying notes 20-37 supra.
200. See text accompanying notes 210 & 211 bsfra.
201. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
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action until such time as the final compensation for the El Teniente
mine could be determined and the status of the $80 million loan de-
cided in light of the indemnification award due the company. Kenne-
cott, on the other hand, maintained that this expansion loan should
have nothing to do with the compensation settlement; it existed only
as a development loan, apart from the earlier 1967 compensation agree-
ment. The corporation, therefore, reacted to Chile's equivocation on
this debt by launching two suits in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. The first of these2 1 was filed
against the Republic of Chile on February 2, 1972. The next day
Kennecott filed a second suit 0 3 against an Administrative Commis-
sion established by President Allende to assume the management
duties of the State.2 °4
On February 4, 1972, on motion, the district court ordered all
assets of the Administrative Commission within its jurisdiction to be
attached. 0 ' Likewise, on February 18, 1972, the assets of the Re-
public of Chile within the jurisdiction were ordered attached.2"" The
Chilean government acquiesced under such economic pressure and
agreed to resume payments on the loan.207 The two suits were settled
and dismissed on March 31, 1972.208 To date, the first two install-
ments, totaling approximately $11.5 million,. have been paid, the first
on March 31, 1972 and the second on July 3, 1972.'09
In the case of Anaconda, no payments were to begin on the 51
per cent equity capital purchased in the Chuquicamata and El Sal-
vador mines until June 30, 1970. The first three installments, totaling
approximately $35 million, had been paid to Anaconda by the time
the constitutional amendment was put into effect. Following the na-
tionalization of the mines, these were considered deductible from any
payable compensation. Furthermore, the Chilean government agreed
to the schedule of payments due Anaconda, but only in amounts total-
ing the final compensation award to be received by that company.
Thus, if no compensation was due, no payments would be due. In
other words, the nationalization legislation was actually interpreted
202. Braden Copper Co. v. Republic of Chile, Civil No. 72-509 (S.D.N.Y., filed
Feb. 2, 1972).
203. Braden Copper Co. v. Administrative Commission, Civil No. 72-508 (S.D.-
N.Y., filed Feb. 3, 1972).
204. Presidential Decree No. 73, July 17, 1971.
205. Civil No. 72-508 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 4,1972).
206. Civil No. 72-509 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 18, 1972).
207. Interview with Claudio Bonnefoy, Legal Advisor, Chilean Embassy, in
Washington, D.C., Feb. 28, 1972.
208. Civil Nos. 72-508, 72-509 (S.D.N.Y., filed Mar. 31, 1972).
209. Kennecott Copper Corporation, Confiscation of El Teniente: Kennecott
Pursues Its Remedies Outside of Chile (Supp. 3, Dec. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as Pursuit].
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to encompass the 49 per cent privately held interest, in addition to all
notes due on the previously purchased 51 per cent interest in the
Chuquicamata and El Salvador mines."' 0
* As a direct consequence of this action, Anaconda also filed suit
against Chile in New York, and the assets of the Corporaci6n del
Cobre and the Corporaci6n del Fomento were once again attached by
the federal courts.2 ' The repercussions of this retaliatory action are
still uncertain as of the time of this writing.
The above-mentioned deductions were applied by the Comptroller
General'tin an effort to. calculate the real book values of the companies
involved. Although these measures hardly conformed to the com-
.panies' estimations of their own "going concern" values, the use of
real book value in determining compensation awards was fully sanc-
tioned by :the Chilean constitutional amendment. Thus, the provisions
,for compensation are part of the supreme law of the land. To question
the legitimate usage of real book value is to challenge the Constitution
itself. Chile's interpretation of just or appropriate compensation, there-
fore, enjoys a certain element of legal immunity by virtue of its consti-
tutional nature.212
b. Fiscal and Social Misfeasance
As an extension of Chile's defense of its privileges as a sovereign
nation, the State has summarily asserted its right to adjust the compen-
sation awards to take into account those policies and practices of the
nationalized companies which infringed upon the welfare of the Chilean
community.213 Although the practices in question may well have been
within the law at the time of their execution, their results were such as
to inflict damage upon the Chilean society. The principle that otherwise
lawful acts are subject to legal sanctions if the effects of such acts vio-
late the rights of others is an intrinsic element in the legal systems of
most states.214 In Western law, this notion is generally referred to as
210. 1971 Bonnefoy Interview, supra note 186.
211. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Corporaci6n del Cobre, Civil No. 72-878 (S.D.N.Y.,
Feb. 28, 1972).
212. In fact, the copper companies' adjudicative appeals did not attempt to ques-
tion the usage of "book value" as opposed to "going concern" value. Rather, the
companies' briefs questioned the method by which book value was estimated. See, e.g.,
Confiscation, supra note 3, at 9.
213. See, e.g., President Allende, supra note 13; Decree Concerning Excess Profits
of Copper Companies, Sept. 28, 1971, in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1235 (1971)
' [hereinafter cited as Excess Profits Decree].
214. Domestic law in the United States contains this legal notion in its general
concept of misfeasance. Chilean law similarly contains this general principle of law,
,,normally referred to as "abuse of the law" (principio de abuso del derecho). See
generally C6DICOS DE LA REP6iBLICA DE CHILE arts. 945-2110 (1954).
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fiscal and social malfeasance. I have chosen this concept to encompass
the aggregate of those abuses allegedly perpetrated on the Chilean
nation by the private companies concerned.
Chile's nationalization amendment clearly provides the State with
the legislative tools with which it can secure redress for damages suffered
at the hands of the foreign mining enterprises. This has been the most
controversial aspect of the Chilean nationalization scheme, especially be-
cause of the retroactive nature of these punitve deductions. Included in
this category were two principal deductions: (1) excess profits earned
by the nationalized companies since 1955; and (2) loans which the Gov-
ernment determined had not been "invested usefully." '215 Both of these
items were to be assessed by the President of the Republic in accordance
with his constitutional mandate. 16
Certainly the largest overall deductions from the base book values
of the nationalized companies were those amounts representing alleged
excess profits. The primary aim of this deduction was to obtain reim-
bursement from the mining companies for the injustices they pur-
portedly perpetrated on Chile during more than a half-century of
mining operations. President Allende reiterated this allegation in his
decision to deduct excess profits from the companies' compensation
awards. The Executive Decree Concerning Excess Profits of Copper
Companies of September 28, 1971 read in part:
[T]he Constitution establishes a procedure for fixing compen-
sation in favor of said enterprises. Rectifying an historic past
that permitted the exploitation of basic natural resources of major
copper mines by private investors, without adequate legislation
to preserve to the State its right to receive the benefits of said
exploitation, the Constitution has provided that deduction may
be made of the excess profits obtained by foreign enterprises as
a means of restoring to the country the legitimate participation
it should have obtained from said natural resources. This decla-
ration responds to the will to acknowledge that the national
patrimony represented by its basic natural resources should be at
the service of national interests, over and above any private
interests, national and foreign.217
Calculations of excess profits were to be computed retroactively,
beginning as of May 5, 1955, the date of passage of Chile's "New Deal
on Copper."21  This legislation initially established Chile's Depart-
ment of Copper (now the state copper corporation, CODELCO). In
215. CONSTITucI6N POLiTICA art. (transitory) 17, § b, para. 1 & § h, para. 5 (1971).
216. Id.
217. Excess Profits Decree, supra note 213, at 1238.
218. Law No. 11,828, May 5, 1955.
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addition, the 1955 law instituted a new tax system to be used to assess
the earnings of the copper firms operating in Chile. The new Depart-
ment of Copper was assigned the task of keeping current records on
the nation's copper industries. The Allende administration claimed
that the copper companies' books prior to 1955 falsified the real profits
gleaned from Chile's mines and that the prior tax system was so
riddled with loopholes that taxes paid were of no aid in deciphering
profits reaped by the mining companies. 219 As a consequence, profits
before May 1955 could not be accounted for or deducted in the na-
tionalization legislation. °
The action to compute and deduct excess profits was set in motion
on August 30, 1971, when the Comptroller General, in compliance
with the regulations established by the constitutional amendment, re-
quested that the President determine whether excessive profits had
been earned, and whether these profits should be deducted from the
compensation awards.22' A period of thirty days was constitutionally
granted in which the President was to make his computations.222 The
nationalization legislation outlined two methods by which the excess
profits might be determined. First, "the normal profits they [the com-
panies] have obtained in their international operations '228 might be
considered. The average rates of profit earned by each of the com-
panies in their mining ventures in the rest of the world, excluding
Chile, would be compared to their rates of profit in Chile. The average
international profit rates thus arrived at were to be used as a basis for
estimating an acceptable average rate of profit. A higher rate of profit
earned in Chile would thus indicate that excessive profits had been
earned relative to similar operations in the rest of the world.
As a second alternative, the amendment provided that "agree-
ments which the Chilean State may have concluded on the subject of
maximum profitability of foreign companies established in the coun-
try' 224 might also be used as guidelines in determining an equitable rate
of profit for mining operations in Chile. An average rate of profit higher
than agreed-upon standards might be considered excessive. This provi-
sion was an obvious reference to the controversial regulations on foreign
capital and technology promulgated pursuant to the Cartagena Agree-
ment of May 26, 1969.25 Under these regulations the Andean nations
219. President Allende, supra note 13.
220. CODELCO Press Conference, supra note 169.
221. See Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1245.
222. CONSTITucI6N POLITICA art. (transitory) 17, § b, para. 2 (1971).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. The Cartagena Agreement, creating the so-called Andean Common Market,
was signed by Boliva, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru at Bogota, May 26, 1969,
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of Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia, agreed to limit the an-
nual remittances of profits earned by foreign investors in their countries
to 14 per cent of invested capital. Profits above and beyond this re-
mittance ceiling were required to be reinvested locally.226 This pact is
the only external profit remittance limitation existing in Chile.
The Allende administration opted to employ the first of these possi-
ble techniques to estimate excessive profits.227 Data concerning each of
the companics' international operations was gathered from the enter-
prises' own accounts, and their average rates of profit in the rest of the
world were subsequently estimated. The Cerro Company's Rio Blanco
(Andina) mine and Anaconda's Ex6tica mine were not figured in these
investigations because they had been operating less than a year on De-
cember 31, 1970, and, therefore, as yet had shown no annual profits. It
was discovered in these investigations that the Anaconda Corporation
earned an average 3.67 per cent on its investments in the aggregate of
its international businesses apart from Chile. In Chile, however, Ana-
conda's average rate of profit on the book value of its assets between
1955 and 1970 was calculated to be approximately 16.68 per cent: 21.51
per cent at Chuquicamata and 11.84 per cent at El Salvador. Thus, the
net difference between Anaconda's rate of profit on its operations in
Chile as compared to its operations in the rest of the world was over
13 per cent.228 In other words, every dollar Anaconda invested in
Chile returned four times as much profit as its average dollar invested
elsewhere.
Similarly, Kennecott's multiple investments in the rest of the
world were found to produce a much lower rate of profit than the
mining company was earning in Chile. In its international activities,
Chilean officials discovered that Kennecott averaged profits of about
9.95 per cent on its investments. Meanwhile, El Teniente yielded an
annual rate of profit of 52.87 per cent between 1955 and 1970, a net
difference of almost 43 per cent between the rate of profit in Chile and
in the rest of Kennecott's international operations.229 These results,
the government claimed, offered an irrefutable picture of economic
imperialism perpetuated by wealthy elites against the less developed
and went into effect in October 1969. For an English translation, see 8 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 910 (1969).
In November-December 1970, the governing commission established by the
Agreement met and promulgated a series of rules and regulations dealing with three
main areas: tariffs, foreign investments, and imports of foreign technology. See
Rundt's Weekly Intelligence, Feb. 2, 1971, at 3.
226. Rundt's Weekly Intelligence, Feb. 2, 1971, at 5.
227. See Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7.
228. CODELCO, Resumen Informativo Especial Sobre la Nacionalizaci6n del
Cobre, Circular No. 187, Oct. 18, 1971, at 5.
229. Id.
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nations.23 ° In his executive message of September 28, 1971, which
announced the Government's decision to deduct excessive profits,
Allende stormed:
[T]he backwardness and poverty which afflict numerous com-
munities of the land are not phenomena that can be analyzed out
of context with international economic relations existing between
poor and wealthy countries. Foreign investment - so it is
said - is one of the mechanisms that can contribute to raising
the standard of living and increasing the rate of development in
the underdeveloped countries. As a matter of fact, however, this
mechanism has been converted into just one more element which,
in conjunction with the financial dependency and unequal inter-
change, has served to mold the subordination of backward na-
tions to the economically powerful countries.23'
The second legislated deduction intended to redress alleged in-
justices perpetrated by the North American mining companies in-
volved certain loans which were determined not to have been "invested
usefully. '23 2 Kennecott has thus far been the only one of the three
companies to have been penalized on this account, and even this pro-
ceeding came about indirectly. As discussed above, in March 1972,
the Chilean government agreed to resume repayments on the $80 mil-
lion expansion loan granted to Chile under the Frei administration.233
It was at this point that the Chief Executive determined that a por-
tion of the $80 million reloaned to Compania Minera El Teniente
had not been "invested usefully" and, therefore, would be deducted
from the $93 million due on the loan. As it stands at this time, this
230. The following excess profits were deducted from the base book values of the
three affected companies of the Gran Mineria:
1) Cia. Minera Chuquicamata S.A..... $300,000,000.00
2) Cia. Minera El Salvador S.A... $ 64,000,000.00
3) Cia. Minera El Teniente S.A $410,000,000.00
Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1251-53. The companies disputed
these figures, asserting that the Government was in error in computing the excessive
profits deductions. Kennecott, for instance, argued that its "net total, final income"
from the period between 1955 and 1970 was only $253.3 million, after taxes, dividends,
and earnings had been paid to the State. Kennecott maintained that the Chilean
government, on the other hand, had retained $1057.8 million of El Teniente's total
profits during this period. According to Kennecott's calculations, even if withholding
taxes and the State's portion of El Teniente's earnings were added to the $253.3
million, the total would still be less than the $410 million figure which Chile had
ruled constituted excessive profits. Thus, the deduction for excess profits alone was
greater than Braden's total earnings during the period under consideration, according
to Kennecott. See Confiscation, supra note 3, at 45-46.
At this point it must be noted that these differences in accounting are largely
academic. Undoubtedly, Chile's methods of accounting served its own interests, as
the companies' served theirs. The larger and more important question concerns the
legal right of a sovereign nation to make such punitive deductions from indemnifica-
tion awards in cases of nationalization of foreign-owned property.
231. Excess Profits Decree, supra note 213, at 1239.
232. CONSTITUcI6N POLiTICA art. (transitory) 17, § h, para. 5 (1971).
233. See text accompanying note 207 supra.
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specified deduction, amounting to approximately $8.6 million, will be
deducted from the final installment payment due on the loan in 1986.
Thus, no real conflict is foreseen on this matter until this installment
becomes due. 23
4
The concept of deducting damages for fiscal and social misfeas-
ance from compensation awards is not unknown in the history of
interstate practice. Indemnification provisions in a number of in-
stances have reflected reductions in the valuation of assets taken in
order to compensate a nationalizing state for costs imposed by the
affected enterprises. 235 Such punitive deductions have previously been
justified for the recovery of items unpaid at the time of nationalization,
such as taxes, royalties, and dividends. Similarly, deductions have
been exacted for harmful production methods and economic policies
that had been employed in order to maximize the owners' profits. Even
excessive profits have been deducted from possible compenstation to
redress partially financial injury sustained during the operations of
nationalized enterprises.
The attempted nationalization of the assets of the British-owned
Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in May 1955 is one of the
earliest cases in point.236 The AIOC had been extracting petroleum
products from the sub-soil of Iran in accordance with a concession
granted in 1933. Since that time, it had netted an average of $500
million annually in profits; of this amount, the government of Iran
had received a total of only $45 million in taxes, royalties, and its
share of the profits. By 1951 this exploitation of Iran's natural re-
sources had become politically intolerable, and the Iranian govern-
ment moved to nationalize the petroleum industry. On the basis of
the Gass-Golshayan Agreement of July 17, 1949,237 the Iranian govern-
ment charged that the AIOC owed Iran some £ 49 million in back taxes,
dividends withheld, and royalties owned. In addition, Iran demanded
payment of damages suffered as a result of AIOC's attempts to halt
the sale of Iranian oil around the world.238
The case was appealed to the International Court of Justice, but
to no avail; the court decided that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the
case, and therefore could not pass on its merits. '39 Thus, the Iranian
claim remained in limbo until the Iranian government collapsed shortly
234. Interview with Claudio Bonnefoy, Legal Advisor, Chilean Embassy, in Wash-
ington, D.C., Sept. 22, 1972 [hereinafter cited as 1972 Bonnefoy Interview].
235. See text accompanying notes 236-50 infra.
236. See Rafat, supra note 61, at 222.
237. For a detailed analysis of the applicability of the Gass-Golshayan Agree-
ment of July 17, 1949, see Rafat, supra note 61, at 222-26.
238. Id. at 225.
239. Id. at 227.
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afterward, in August 1953. The new government agreed to form
an international consortium of petroleum industries into which the
assets of the AIOC would be contributed. Meanwhile, the shareholders
in AIOC were compensated in full from consortium funds, relieving Iran
from the burden of compensating the affected owners for Iran's re-
form program.240 However, the important legal question which sur-
rounded the early nationalization legislation, i.e., the right of a gov-
ernment to levy retroactive charges against a foreign-owned enterprise
within its territorial domain was left unresolved.
The Peruvian nationalization of the assets of the North American-
owned International Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1969 is the most
recent case which will be considered here. On October 3, 1968, a mili-
tary coup d'itat overthrew the government of President Belaiinde
Terry and established a leftist military dictatorship which still presides
in Peru today. One of the first acts of the new regime was to national-
ize the assets of IPC in Peru in the La Brea and Parifias oilfields.
Within a few months, IPC was informed that they would be charged
$690.5 million for Peruvian petroleum deposits extracted and marketed
abroad since the commencement of operations in 1924. In addition,
another $54.8 million was added to this debt for damages resulting
from harmful production methods employed during periods of poor
relations with the Government. In all, the new Peruvian administra-
tion made claims of approximately $754.5 million against the private
company. The Government subsequently proceeded to evaluate the
IPC assets in Peru at $71 million, and a check for this amount was
immediately drawn in the name of IPC. This money was transferred
to the Peruvian Central Bank where it was thereupon embargoed until
such time as the company's debts to Peru had been met.241
IPC, of course, appealed the case to the Peruvian courts, main-
taining that the seizure of its assets without compensation constituted
unconstitutional confiscation of private property. 2 ' Both the Superior
Court of Lima248 and the Peruvian Supreme Court244 found the case
inadmissible, however, and ruled that new executive decrees overrode
previous statutory law as a matter of course. The courts' arguments
were couched in language respecting the "nationalistic needs" of the
240. Id. at 230.
241. See Furnish, Peruvian Domestic Law Aspects of the La Brea y Parifias
Controversy, 59 Ky. L.J. 351 (1970).
242. Expediente No. 969/68, Oct. 14, 1968, submitted before the Superior Court
of Lima, Fifth Correctional Tribunal. The English translation is given in Esso
INTER-AMERICA, 2 THE BREA Y PARIfiAS CONTROVERSy Doc. No. 67 (1969).
243. Expediente No. 969/68, R.S., Nov. 9, 1968 (Trib. Corr.).
244. Expediente No. 939/68, R.S., Jan. 3, 1969 (Corte Suprerna).
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"de facto" government and the best interests of the nation, akin to
the "political question" rhetoric of our own courts. As for the un-
constitutionality of the act, the courts determined that compensation had
unquestionably been provided as required by international and domes-
tic law. The issue of the IPC debt to Peru which nullified that com-
pensation was ruled to have been within the legal and sovereign rights
of the Peruvian state to obtain redress for damages that country had
suffered as a result of IPC's intolerable monopoly over Peru's pe-
troleum resources.24 Under Peru's legal concept of "reivindicaci6n,"
the State was simply recovering ownership of property from a pos-
sessor who had no legal right to it. 46
The new Government's position was also outlined in responses
to petitions filed by IPC with the Ministry of Development and Public
Works and with the Executive.247  In both instances, the Peruvian
government rejected the corporation's pleas on the grounds that Peru
had fully met its international and domestic legal obligations. In
the executive message, the commanding generals reminded IPC that
Spanish law, dating back to 1128, reserved all mineral rights for the
Crown.248  Although titles to land were granted in the early 1900's,
it had always been tacitly understood that subsoil rights belonged
exclusively to the State. The Peruvian petroleum codes have, since
1873, only recognized concessionary contracts to exploit minerals and
subsoil products; there is no legal provision for private ownership of
subsoil properties.249 To explain its arguments juridically, the admin-
istration cited a 1963 Peruvian Supreme Court ruling upholding the
245. Expediente No. 969/68, R.S., Nov. 9, 1968 (Trib. Corr.).
246. Furnish offered an explanation of the concept:
Good faith of the possessor is no defense to the obligation to make restitution
where depletion of the property has occurred. Reivindicaci6n involved no question
of use by the possessor; it simply forces him to surrender all of the property to
the owner, making reparation for whatever part of the original property cannot
be returned.
Furnish, supra note 241, at 370-71.
247. IPC's petitions read in part:
[W]e point out that in the period of more than forty years in which we have
been in possession of the La Brea y Pariias oilfields, such possession has been
public, peaceful, and consented to by several governments .. .and has never beenjudicially questioned.
IPC Appeal of April 12, 1969, in Esso INTER-AMERICA, 3 THE BREA Y PARIfiAS
CONTROVERSY, Doc. No. 93 (1969) [hereinafter cited as 3 CONTROVERSY].
248. S.R. No. 095-EM, Aug. 6, 1969, in 3 CONTROVERSY, supra note 247, Doc.
No. 109.
249. Articles 2 and 3 of the Mining Code of Peru provide:
In accordance with these principles, mining property, regardless of its form or
nature, is the property of the state and its exploitation is considered as a matter
of public concern (utilidad pfiblica). The government grants the right to explore
for periods of up to five years, and the right to exploit for an indefinite period.
PAN AMERICAN UNION, MINING AND PETROLEUM LEGISLATION IN LATIN AMERICA 281
(2d ed. 1969).
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congressional legislation of that year which first invalidated the IPC
claim to the La Brea and Parifias properties. 50
The Peruvian government thus steadfastly held that it had not
violated international rights as guaranteed by the United Nations. It
had enacted domestic legislation to execute by legal means a national-
ization program and, as a sovereign state, had demanded restitution
for damages suffered as a result of foreign interference in its economic
affairs. Furthermore, Peruvian courts were established to hear all
disputes which arose from these actions.
Although the United States government was understandably dis-
tressed over the actions of the Peruvian government, it is notable that
no serious reprisals were taken against the new military regime. Eco-
nomic aid to Peru has been reduced considerably since 1968, although
at a recent meeting of the International Monetary Fund, former Sec-
retary of the Treasury Connally was reported to have offered "warm
support" to the Peruvians." ' It is generally conceded that the State
Department feared the consequences of taking direct action against the
Peruvian government, lest such measures would drive the left-of-center
regime further into the socialist anti-imperialist camp.
Thus, it is obvious that Chile's deductions of damages from the
compensation awards provided for the mining enterprises are not en-
tirely unprecedented in interstate practice. In fact, the concept of
retribution for alleged injustices, in and of itself, might be viewed as
quite justifiable. However, in the Chilean case, this issue becomes
considerably more debatable since, when these deductions for fiscal
and social misfeasance are combined with the other deductions dis-
cussed, the total of the deductions greatly exceeds the original base
book values of several of the mining enteprises.252 In effect, com-
250. On November 6, 1963, the Peruvian legislature passed Laws Nos. 14,695 &
14,696, which invalidated the 1922 international arbitration award which had originally
granted the subsoil rights of the La Brea and Parifias fields to IPC. The Supreme
Court later used these laws as grounds for rejecting IPC's appeal. See Expediente
No. 939/68, R.S., Jan. 3, 1969 (Corte Suprema).
251. Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1971, at A12, col. 1.
252. The State Defense Council announced shortly after the Comptroller General's
initial compensation decree that the Department of Studies had not completed its
constitutional mandate; several possible deductions had not been investigated which
should have been. In particular, the Council charged that in some cases the major
copper producers had been "high-grading" in the mines, a production technique
whereby a disproportionate amount of good ore is removed from the mines while
allowing waste to accumulate so as to maximize short-run gains. The Council esti-
mated that it would cost CODELCO as much as $30 million to bring the ore and
waste extraction levels back into balance.
In addition, the President of the Council charged that the North American
companies had been shipping anode bars laden with gold, silver, and selenium from
Chile. These precious metals were never accounted for since they were mixed in the
copper and extracted in plants in the United States. Exact figures on the extent of
this sort of activity were unavailable, although the Council promised the matter was
being investigated. If findings disclosed that large amounts of metal had been shipped
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pensation to three of the five nationalized mines was wholly eliminated
by the State's deductions. Of the three North American firms affected
by the reforms, only the Cerro Company was not charged with owing
the Chilean state millions of dollars. The book value of Cerro's Rio
Blanco (Andina) mine was listed at $20,145,469.44. This valuation
was reduced by only $1,875,768.09 following deductions for the mineral
deposits themselves and the minor deductions for assets received in
defective condition.
2 53
In the case of the Anaconda Company, total deductions from its
Chuquicamata and El Salvador properties exceeded the combined
book value of these mines by $78,078,570.65. 254 However, Anaconda's
third holding in Chile, the Ex6tica mine, was to receive $10,010,445.11
in compensation after minor deductions for mineral deposits and assets
received in defective condition had been subtracted from its estimated
base book value of $14,815,052.52.255
The Kennecott Corporation's El Teniente mine accrued by far
the largest net deficit of any of the three mining enterprises, primarily
due to the enormous reduction in compensation for excessive profits.
Deductions totaling $629,227,615.98 were subtracted from a book value
of $318,801,198.77, leaving Kennecott with a negative balance of
$310,426,417.21.2 "0
It seems fairly certain at this point that Anaconda and Kenne-
cott will not be held responsible for their net deficits as calculated in
the compensation proceedings. In a news conference following the
Government's announcement of the compensation awards, the Chilean
Comptroller General indicated that the constitutional amendment did
not expressly provide for the collection of net deficits resulting from in-
demnification settlements, and that such action was not contemplated.
257
C. Adjudication of Conflicts of Interest
1. Local Remedies
General Assembly Resolution 1803 is quite firm in pronouncing
that the first resort for settlement of disputes arising from instances of
nationalization, expropriation, or requisitioning of private property
from Chile without being taxed, these amounts were also to be deductible from the
companies' base book values. CODELCO Press Conference, supra note 169.
253. Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1253.
254. Id. at 1251-52.
255. Id. at 1252.
256. Id. at 1252-53.
257. Interview with Claudio Bonnefoy, Legal Advisor, Chilean Embassy, in Wash-
ington, D.C., Oct. 14, 1971. In a subsequent news conference that day, the President
of the State Defense Council stated that the Comptroller General's statement regarding
Chile's recovery of any net deficits was unsupported by the legislation. According to
the Defense Council, this matter would be left to the Special Tribunal to decide.
CODELCO Press Conference, supra note 169.
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must be to the domestic courts of the nationalizing state, unless there
is an agreement to the contrary. Point 4 states:
In any case where the question of compensation gives rise to a
controversy, the national jurisdiction of the State taking such
measures shall be exhausted. 58
In order to fulfill this requisite, the Chilean constitutional amendment
assured that both the Government and the private nationalized com-
panies were permitted to appeal the administration's proposed com-
pensation settlements in Chilean courts.'5" For this purpose, a Special
Tribunal was established by the legislation to hear cases exclusively
pertaining to the nationalization of the five large mines.2"' According to
the administration's own interpretation of the amendment, the Special
Tribunal may not adjudicate other nationalization proceedings apart
from the nationalization of the Gran Mineria and Andina.26 1
The Tribunal itself is a judicial body composed of five members:
the Director of the Internal Revenue Service, the President of the
Central Bank, one judge from the Court of Appeals of Santiago, one
Supreme Court justice, and one representative of the Constitutional
Tribunal. The Director of the Internal Revenue Service and the Presi-
dent of the Central Bank are appointed to their positions by the Presi-
dent; consequently, they are considered sympathetic to the views of
the administration. The Supreme Court Justice and the representative
from the Court of Appeals were both selected from their respective
bodies to serve on the Special Tribunal. Both of these courts have
traditionally maintained a conservative posture in Chile. Finally, the
members of the Constitutional Tribunal, who are appointed by the
President with the approval of Congress, elected one of their number
to serve on the Special Tribunal." 2
The Chilean government maintains that the Special Tribunal pro-
vides adequate judicial appeals for both the Government and the na-
tionalized companies. In any case, it can be argued that foreign in-
vestors indirectly consent to abide by all existing laws and judicial
proceedings in a host nation by virtue of their willingness to invest in
that nation in the first place. Likewise, the Chilean Civil Code pro-
vides that "all assets located in Chile are subject to Chilean laws even
when the owners of said assets are foreigners and reside abroad."20
The nationalized enterprises, on the other hand, have maintained
that the adjudicative procedures as provided in the Special Tribunal
258. See G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 42, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
259. CONSTITUcI6N POLiTICA art. (transitory) 17, § c, para. 1 (1971).
260. Id.
261. 1972 Bonnefoy Interview, supra note 234.
262. CONSTITUcI6N POLiTICA art. (transitory) 17, § c, para. 1 (1971).
263. C6DIGOS DE LA REP1BLICA DE CHILE art. 16 (1954).
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skirt the system of higher courts which were extant in Chile at the
time the companies contracted their investments. Consequently, the
affected enterprises openly accused the Chilean government of pur-
posefully preventing "recourse to the established judicial system so
that any equitable compensation would be impossible." '26 4 Nonethe-
lcss, the equity of the appeals procedure as provided by the .constitu-
tional amendment was not argued by either side before the Special
Tribunal.2 6
By December 1971, all three North American companies had filed
petitions with the Special Tribunal to seek more favorable terms of in-
demnification.26 6 The Cerro Company had actually filed for an early
decision due to the relative simplicity of its case.267 These legal briefs
did not question the use of "book value," however, nor did they chal-
lenge the right of Chile to make deductions from these base figures.
Rather the thrust of the companies' arguments was to reject individ-
ually the specific deductions applied by the Government.
The first petitions filed by the companies before the Special
Tribunal, however, did not go to the merits, but were concerned with
the competence of the Tribunal to review the deductions made for "ex-
cess profits. '26" Although these deductions were protested in principle,
there remained some question as to whether the excess profits ruling
was subject to review by the Tribunal. Kennecott's first specific peti-
tion in its appeal, for instance, stated:
If the Tribunal decides that it lacks the authority to hear and
express itself with regard to this concrete point of our appeal, a
study of the other materials and the controversy before the Trib-
unal would have no objective whatsoever. Not only the law, but
also prudence and fairness counsel that we should avoid a useless
trial at such an elevated cost to us.
Therefore, we request that the Tribunal, in resolving the admissi-
bility of the appeal presented, specifically pronounce itself re-
garding the admissibility in the part where protest is made against
the deduction for excessive earnings, based on the competence
conferred by transitory Article 17 of the Political Constitu-
tion.26 9
264. Kennecott Copper Corporation, supra note 28, at i.
265. In most instances, international law suggests that local remedies be exhausted
in interstate conflicts before further action can be taken.
266. Petition of Braden Copper Company, Roll No. 2, Oct. 27, 1971; Petition of
Cerro de Pasco, Roll Nos. 6 & 11, Oct. 28, 1971; Petition of Chilex Mining Company,
Roll No. 4, Dec. 3, 1971; Petition of Andes Mining Company, Roll No. 5, Dec. 3. 1971.
267. Petition of Cerro de Pasco, Roll Nos. 6 & 11, Oct. 28, 1971.
268. See, e.g., Confiscation, supra note 3, at 55.
269. Id. at 55-56.
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For its part, the State Defense Council filed its brief with the
Tribunal, which in several instances demanded even more extensive
deductions from the already computed book values of the mixed com-
panies.2 70 Subsequently, the Council filed a second series of briefs
claiming that the Special Tribunal had no judicial authority to review
the executive decree concerning excess profits.271 In this appeal, the
Council argued that the decree on excess profits was singularly differ-
ent from the other deductions outlined in the constitutional amend-
ment, for it was the only such deduction requiring specific action to
be taken by the Chief Executive. Citing the Chilean legal concept of
"executive privilege" (facultad exclusiva), which retains for the Chief
Executive exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters, the Council
claimed that:
[I]n no case can the decision of the President of the Republic be
submitted to revision. It reiterates in this respect what was
manifested earlier with regard to the fact that the decision is of
non-jurisdictional content, and, by its very nature, incompatible
with a possible decision of any tribunal. 2
Following three months of discussions and hearings, the Special
Tribunal, in March 1972, reached a decision regarding its authority
to review the executive decree on excess profits. Its ruling in favor of
the State Defense Council declared that the presidential decree was of
a "non-jurisdictional" nature in this case and that the Tribunal was,
therefore, not empowered to review this aspect of the nationalization
appeals.2"3 Shortly afterward, Kennecott withdrew its petition from
the Tribunal, threatening to take reprisals in other nations of the
world.2 4 Anaconda similarly is expected to drop claims for compen-
sation for its two large mines, El Salvador and Chuquicamata, al-
though its appeal still remains before the Chilean Tribunal at the time
of this writing. This is principally because the State has agreed to
indemnify Anaconda for its 75 per cent holdings in Compania Minera
Ex6tica in which the various deductions made by the Comptroller
General did not exceed the company's book value.275
270. Petition of State Defense Council against Chilex Mining Co., Roll No. 9,
Oct. 28, 1971; Petition of State Defense Council against Andes Mining Co., Roll No.
10, Oct. 28, 1971; Petition of State Defense Council against Braden Copper Co., Roll
No. 7, Dec. 3, 1971.
271. Petition of State Defense Council against Braden Copper Co., Roll No. 2,
Jan. 17, 1972; Petition of State Defense Council against Chilex Mining Co., Roll No. 4,
Jan. 17, 1972; Petition of State Defense Council against Andes Mining Co., Roll No. 5,
Jan. 17, 1972.
272. Confiscation, supra note 3, at 79.
273. Special Tribunal Decision on the Question of Excess Profits of Nationalized
Copper Companies, Aug. 11, 1972, in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1013-61 (1972).
274. Pursuit, supra note 209, at 49.
275. Cf. Comptroller General's Resolution, supra note 7, at 1252.
[VOL. 18: p. 593
50
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 4 [1973], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol18/iss4/2
CHILE'S LARGE COPPER COMPANIES
2. Recourse to International Remedies
Given the deeply entrenched positions of both Chile and the
United States, it still seems too early to determine the eventual rami-
fications that the Chilean nationalizations may have on international
law and interstate practice in general. The lawfulness of Chile's na-
tionalization reforms can only be measured over a period of time. Cer-
tainly, Chile is not likely to alter its own perception of its rights as a
sovereign state, nor is it apt to alter its interpretation of existing legal
norms. The Chilean government remains confident that its actions
lie within the limits of international law and accepted practice, since
the nationalization legislation, as designed, provides compensation
based upon the real book value of the affected assets. Chilean legisla-
tors have remained equally adamant that their efforts to obtain redress
of damages are totally justified within existing international norms.
If compensation has been eliminated by such measures, they argue, it
is not because Chile has willfully violated prescribed international
standards.
At the same time, the United States, with the support of other
capital-exporting nations, will most assuredly refuse to concede the
legality of Chile's nationalization program. In addition to recognizing
the companies' more specific obligations to redress damages in Chile,
an admission of responsibility on the part of the North American
enterprises would abandon a possible deterrent to similar nationalist
actions in the future. Instead, the United States has emphatically
declared that Chile has overstepped the bounds of traditional inter-
national law. Speaking in behalf of the nationalized United States
interest, Secretary of State Rogers stated:
The United States government is deeply disappointed and dis-
turbed at this serious departure from accepted standards of in-
ternational law. Under established principles of international law,
the expropriation must be accompanied by reasonable provision for
payment of just compensation. The United States has made clear
to the Government of Chile its hope that a solution could be found
on a reasonable and pragmatic basis consistent with international
law.2
76
However, the United States has not confined its condemnations of
Chile's acts to mere diplomatic rhetoric. Largely as a consequence of
Chile's treatment of the American-owned mines, financial aid from
most private and public sources in the Western world has virtually
been halted. Lines of short-term credit have fallen from $220 million
276. U.S. Dep't of State, Press Release No. 234, Oct. 13, 1971, in 65 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 478 (1971).
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in August 1970, to $32 million in June 1972.277 There have been no
new loans to Chile from the World Bank during the last 22 months,
for instance, although Chile has claimed to have met all the necessary
technical requirements for such loans.178 This stifled flow of funds
from the World Bank is generally attributed to United States opposi-
tion, on the ground that the Chileans are no longer credit-worthy. In
reaction to these policies, Chile's governor to the World Bank scored
the Bank for acting in a "manifestly precipitate and prejudiced man-
ner ... not as an independent multinational body at the service of the
economic development of all of its members, but in fact as a spokes-
man or instrument of private interests of one of its member coun-
tries. '217  Similar criticisms have been leveled against the Inter-
American Development Bank. In Chile, President Allende stated
recently that such measures taken by the United States "have amounted
to a virtual economic blockade" which has been extremely detrimental to
the impoverished Chilean economy."'
Current attempts by the Chilean government to renegotiate portions
of its vast foreign debt have similarly encountered considerable inter-
ference from United States interests. During conferences with its credi-
tor nations in Paris this past year, Chile won agreement in principle for
renegotiation of its foreign debt, about half of which is owed to the
United States. 281' However, the agreement stated that details must be
ironed out bilaterally between Chile and each of its creditors, and the
United States has thus far refused to consider bilateral talks until "just
compensation" is awarded to the nationalized mining firms.
The Kennecott Corporation is responsible for the most serious re-
prisals yet to be taken against the Chilean government. Claiming that
the copper produced by El Teniente has been wrongly confiscated, the
multinational corporation has attempted to interfere with the interna-
tional marketing of the Chilean copper. Through court actions, Kenne-
cott is trying to impound or attach all monies paid for Chilean copper in
international sales. Recently, French authorities, on its motion attached
payments for 1250 tons of Chilean copper being shipped to France. 82
The West German cargo vessel carrying this copper diverted its course
to the Netherlands, only to be confronted with a Dutch attachment
order. 55 Similarly, informed sources in Stockholm warned that a $1.5
277. Wash. Post, July 26, 1972, at A18, col. 3.
278. Address by Alfonso Inostroza, President of the Central Bank of Chile, to
Annual Joint Meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, in Wash.
Post, Sept. 29, 1972, at Al, col. 1.
279. Wash. Post, July 26, 1972, at A18, col. 3.
280. Id.
281. See notes 104-08 and accompanying text supra.
282. See Pursuit, supra note 209, at 59.
283. Wash. Post, Oct. 20, 1972, at A24, col. 5.
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million shipment of copper from El Teniente's mines being shipped to
Sweden on a Russian ship might be sequestered on arrival in Sweden."8 4
If these court orders are sustained in France, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Germany, and in other nations, Chile may be forced to seek new
markets for its principal export product.
Perhaps Chile's economic chaos, as countenanced by the world's
capital-exporting nations, will, in itself, determine the lawfulness of its
reforms. If Chile is forced to compromise its sovereign interests in the
international community, surely other nationalizing states are bound to
take heed. By the same token, however, Chile's interpretation of exist-
ing international standards may serve as fodder for other Third World
reform movements. Recent legislation to nationalize United States pe-
troleum interest in Iraq, for example, bears a close resemblance to Chile's
own nationalization amendment.8 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The legal questions that have arisen as a consequence of Chile's
nationalization of the Gran Mineria and Compania Minera Andina
basically concern the determination of "just" compensation as defined
by existing international standards. There is no argument as to
Chile's sovereign right to dispose of its natural resources as it sees fit,
nor is there any question of Chile's responsibility to provide affected
parties with indemnification to compensate for their losses. How-
ever, the affected United States interests and the Chilean government
have both reached summarily different conclusions regarding the ex-
tent of Chile's obligations to the foreign mining companies. The
United States maintains that just compensation must be "prompt, ade-
quate, and effective" in its payment and must reflect the "going con-
cern" value of the enterprise at the time of nationalization. These
assertions are reasonably well founded on numerous decisions reached
by interstate claims commissions, international tribunals, and various
domestic high court rulings. Such precedents constitute an important
source in the construction of international norms or standards.
On the other hand, Chile has charged that, in actuality, there exist
no compelling or prevailing standards of conduct in international prac-
284. Wash. Post, Oct. 17, 1972, at All, col. 2.
285. Law No. 69 of 1972 (Iraq), art 3, in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 84647
(1972), reads:
The State shall pay compensation to the Iraq Petroleum Company Limited for
the rights and assets which have reverted to it in accordance with Article One.
However there shall be deducted from this compensation the sums required to
meet the taxes, fees and wages and any other sums which the government has
demanded or may demand, as well as local debts relating to the operations referred
to, and the means of determining the compensation and deductions, and other
matters required for this purpose, shall be laid down by a regulation.
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tice. Chile admits that numerous interstate documents tend to support
the contentions of the foreign interests, but points to de facto settle-
ments, particularly within the last thirty years, which have demon-
strated a great deal of latitude in interpreting state responsibility to
alien property owners. Thus, it follows that the obligation to deter-
mine "just" compensation must lie, in a sense by default, with the
host nation.
Chile consequently proceeded to resolve the extent and conditions
of its liabilities by taking into consideration the intended social justice
of its reform actions. Realizing that "less than full" compensation
settlements have been accepted in numerous previous instances, Chilean
legislators designed their compensatory provisions to take into ac-
count the way in which the measure of compensation would affect the
State. They further maintained that the State, as a sovereign entity,
had the right to recover damages for the social and fiscal misfeasance
of the foreign enterprises. As restitution for these alleged injustices,
the Chilean government deducted such damages from the compensa-
tion awards to the nationalized companies.
The norms of international law which exist today have evolved
from a composite of international experience in interstate relations.
This development is necessarily on-going; the evolution of standards
of law is a perpetual process as the interstate structure is constantly
changing. It is generally agreed that responsive interpretations of
legal conduct must, therefore, continually be formulated to fit the
transforming realities. Placing the Chilean case within this broader
historical context, it seems plausible to argue that new standards gov-
erning the determination of "just" compensation may be in the process
of evolution. The long line of precedents discussed above, of which
the Chilean case is but the most recent, suggests that domestic con-
siderations can legitimately condition the process of determining the
amount of compensation, as well as the method of payment, due af-
fected aliens. Explicitly rejected is the argument presented by the
United States that a universal minimum standard of "prompt, ade-
quate, and effective" indemnification representing the "going concern"
value of the assets taken must or should be respected in all cases by
all nations. Rather, these precedents stress that "just" compensation
can only be defined within a wider context - one which takes into
account such factors as a state's perception of "social justice" and
its ability to pay.
The American interests have argued in the Chilean case that legal
precedent confirms the obligation of all states to pay "prompt, adequate,
and effective" compensation. However, it appears that most of the
[VOL. 18: p. 593
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precedents cited in support of this position occurred in the pre-World
War II years;"'0 thus the question arises as to whether or not these
precedents can still be considered in conformity with prevailing inter-
national norms. To link these precedents to the contemporary situation,
the companies have cited a number of examples related to the nation-
alization of North American holdings in Cuba during the late 1950's
and 'early 1960's.2"7 While it is true that rulings unilaterally handed
down by.United States claims commissions dealing with the Cuban
cases have tended to confirm -the traditional American position, the
individuals and companies affected by these nationalizations turned to
the United States courts only after failing to reach a satisfactory
accommodation with the Cuban government. Objectively speaking,
therefore, there seems to be no reason to give greater weight to these
unilateral decisions as sources of international law than to the decisions
of the Cuban authorities. The Cuban position was relatively consistent
with numerous other post-war reform measures which rejected tradi-
tional standards as guidelines to the determination of proper indemni-
fication.
This is not meant to imply that new norms regulating compensa-
tion have been generally accepted. Indeed, several recent cases, such
as the 1967 nationalization program in Tanzania,2 88 tend to corrobo-
rate the United States interpretation of the traditional standards. Nota-
bly, the Chilean government limited its position to the argument that
no real standards of compensation exist which serve to define "just"
compensation. Yet even this attitude has generated considerable
heated international controversy. It seems apparent that if there does
exist a movement towards a reformulation of the concept of "just"
compensation, such a redefinition can occur only through a long and
protracted accumulation of experience.
286. See Expropriation, supra note 1, at 64-79.
287. See text accompanying notes 137-49 supra.
288. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
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